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This paper focuses on the tensions between the privileges and 
immunities of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the human 
rights of IGO staff members, and, more specifically, on the consistency of 
IGO internal justice systems (IJSs) with the human right to a fair 
hearing. As some of the more established IGOs enter their seventh 
decade of existence, more attention is being paid to deficiencies in their 
IJSs. IGO staff members are required to first litigate staff grievances 
through an IJS before seeking relief before domestic courts. IGOs are 
immune from suits in domestic courts, so such courts will typically 
decline to exercise jurisdiction. This leaves IGO staff members in the 
lurch. This paper tracks the development of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and United Nations (UN) IJSs. It assesses the 
consistency of these two IJSs with European court jurisprudence on the 
right to a fair trial. The paper concludes that WTO and UN IGO staff 
members are effectively being deprived of their right to have their civil 
rights and obligations determined before an independent and impartial 
tribunal. It concludes with a call for domestic courts, states and civil 
society to join together to pressure IGOs to bring their IJSs into 
conformity with the contours of the human right to a fair hearing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern-day intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) arose from the 
post-second world war international legal order. By some accounts, there 
are currently in excess of 250 IGOs in operation.1 The major IGOs were 
formed following the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences 
of 1944.2 The Bretton Woods Conference concluded with the creation of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), and the 
signing of the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: the 
precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 Collectively, the 
IMF, WB and WTO regulate the international monetary system.4 The 
WB and IMF have progressively had their mandates expanded to cover 
global poverty alleviation.5 Excluding consultants and support staff, 
these institutions presently employ just under 15,000 staff members.6  
  
 1. The UK-based Political Studies Association lists sums tabulated from various 
sources, including notably the Union of International Associations (UIA). See Richard 
Woodward & Michael Davies, How Many International Organizations are There? The 
Yearbook of International Organizations and its Shortcomings, POL. STUD. ASS’N (Oct. 
11, 2015), https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/how-many-international- 
organisations-are-there-yearbook-international.  
 2. A topic explored in depth in STEPHEN BUZDUGAN & ANTHONY PAYNE, THE 
LONG BATTLE FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE Ch. 1 (2016). 
 3. MARC AUBOIN, FULFILLING THE MARRAKECH MANDATE ON COHERENCE: TEN 
YEARS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WTO, IMF AND WORLD BANK 4 (2007), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers13_e.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Fact Sheet: The IMF and the World Bank, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
[hereinafter IMF] (Sep. 26, 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm. 
The WTO, in contrast, has struggled to enter the poverty alleviation domain, through 
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The Dumbarton Oaks conference concluded with the drafting of the 
United Nations (UN) Charter, which was signed a year later in San 
Francisco.7 The UN, initially designed to maintain international peace 
and security, has since developed into the world’s premier international 
political organization, mandated to cover diverse issues from sustainable 
development to good governance to human rights protection to 
humanitarian aid.8 As of 2014, excluding consultants and support staff, 
the UN employs over 40,000 staff members.9 In addition to the 55,000 
staff members employed by the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN, 
there are some 40,000 staff members from other IGOs who are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the International Labor Organization Appeals Tribunal 
(ILOAT).10 
Upon their creation, the major IGOs and their officials were vested 
with the same privileges and immunities enjoyed at the time by 
sovereign states and their dignitaries under international law. In addition 
to immunity from suit in domestic courts, these included inviolability of 
  
various “aid for trade” initiatives that have failed to gain traction. See Thomas Dorsey, 
IMF Survey: What is Aid for Trade?, IMF (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/POL0523A.htm.  
 6. The World Bank website indicates that it has “more than 10,000 employees.” 
See The World Bank, What We Do, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). An IMF fact 
sheet reports that it employs “approximately 2,700” employees. See The IMF at a 
Glance, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017). The WTO Secretariat, the smallest of the three, employs “634 regular staff.” 
World Trade Org. [hereinafter WTO], Overview of the WTO Secretariat, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
 7. See 1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, U.N., 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945-dumbarton-
oaks-and-yalta/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
 8. What We Do, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017).  
 9. See U.N. Secretary-General, Composition of the Secretariat: Gratis 
Personnel, Retired Staff and Consultants and Individual Contractors, U.N. Doc. 
A/69/292 (Aug. 8, 2014). 
 10. Andras Szalay, Equal Treatment and the ILO Administrative Tribunal, 
TILBURG L. SCH. (Apr. 6, 2011), 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1804217. The WTO’s 634 staff 
members should be deducted from this estimate, to avoid double counting. 
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premises and archives, and exemption from taxes.11 In addition, second-
generation IGOs have successfully extended their immunities from suit 
to cover such additional matters as communications, exchanges, and 
travel arrangements necessary for the efficient conduct of official 
business.12 Immunities from suit in particular sought to limit the 
possibility that IGOs or their officials would face any “danger of 
prejudice or bad faith” in the hands of domestic courts, or differing 
interpretations by different states whose courts would review the legal 
acts of IGOs.13  
The UN Charter (UNC) contemplated that “[t]he Organization shall 
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”14 Its 
member representatives and officials, further, “shall similarly enjoy such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise 
of their functions in connection with the Organization.”15 The UNC 
directed the General Assembly to recommend rules relating to necessary 
privileges and immunities.16 These rules were codified a year later in the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(General P&I Convention), which formulated immunity in absolute 
terms:  
The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal 
process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived 
its immunity shall extend to any particular case it has expressly waived 
its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity 
shall extend to any measure of execution.17  
  
 11. See, e.g., Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court, arts 6–7, Sept. 3–10, 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3. 
 12. For the fruits of their labor, see Headquarters Agreement Between the 
Organization of American States and the Government of the United States of America, 
pt. IV, May 14, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-40. 
 13. C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 40 (Stevens & Sons Ltd 
1961). 
 14. U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16. 
 15. Id. ¶ 2. 
 16. Id. ¶ 3. 
 17. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 2, 
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter General P&I Convention]. 
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The General P&I Convention clarified that “[p]rivileges and 
immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Nations 
and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.”18 
Accordingly, the UN Secretary-General has to waive the immunity of 
UN staff members where it would “impede the course of justice and can 
be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.”19  
Two years later, the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 
Specialized Agencies (Specialized P&I Convention) articulated 
analogous standards for IGOs20 and their staff members.21 Major IGOs, 
such as the WTO, refer to the terms of the Specialized P&I Convention 
in their foundational instruments.22 States party to the UNC and other 
IGO treaties promulgated domestic laws that, in many cases, granted 
IGOs absolute immunities from suit.23  
Since the P&I Conventions, the international legal order has changed, 
with the doctrine of absolute immunity ceding to the doctrine of 
functional or restrictive immunity. In the United States, the 1952 Letter 
from Acting Legal Advisor Jack Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip 
Perlman (Tate Letter) ostensibly gave states notice that the Executive 
Branch would recommend “restrictive” immunity for foreign 
sovereigns,24 wherein “immunity is confined to suits involving the 
foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out 
  
 18. Id. art. 5, § 20. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies  
art. 3, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Specialized P&I Convention]. 
 21. Id. art. 6, § 22. 
 22. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 8, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 23. The United States International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 is a 
prime example of such a law. 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288l (2007); see also Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Concluded Between the Swiss Federal 
Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, art. 2, Apr. 19, 1946, 1 
U.N.T.S. 164. It is suggested in the literature that the immunities of IGOs may have risen 
to the level of customary international law. Pietro Pustorino, The Immunity of 
International Organizations from Civil Jurisdiction in the Recent Italian Case Law, 19 
ITALIAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 57, 60–61 (2009). 
 24. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, US Dep’t of State, to Philip 
B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep’t of 
State Bull. 984–85 (1952). 
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of a foreign state’s strictly commercial acts.”25 In the United States, the 
Foreign States Immunities Act of 1976 duly codified the substance of the 
Tate Letter.26 Globally, the emergence of a human rights paradigm in 
international law in the second half of the 20th century clashed with the 
notion of absolute privileges and immunities, based on normatively 
inferior customary international laws of international comity.27  
Sovereign states and their dignitaries, in most jurisdictions, are now 
subject to restrictive immunities from suit. The absolute immunity of 
IGOs, in contrast, has proven resilient to change and, as this paper will 
argue, domestic courts faced with claims against IGOs have exhibited a 
tendency to engage in various issue avoidance techniques to decline 
jurisdiction. This paper argues that the refusal by courts to engage in the 
merits of claims against IGOs creates an accountability gap in the law. 
For suppliers and contractors holding contractual arrangements with 
IGOs, this gap is typically remedied through provision of an arbitration 
waiver contained in the underlying private law instruments.28  
For current or prospective IGO staff, as touched upon above, the 
situation is more nuanced: their only relief lies in recourse to the internal 
justice system (IJS) of their IGO employer. Complaints lodged pursuant 
to the these IJSs have sought recourse for matters ranging from arbitrary 
staff evaluations,29 to unfair dismissals,30 to discrimination in promotion 
  
 25. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006). 
 27. Aaron Young, Deconstruction International Organization Immunity, 44 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 311, 315–30 (2013), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-
journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00113000311.PDF.  
 28. Memorandum of Law in Support of the United Nations to Dismiss and 
Intervene, 4 (Oct. 2, 2007), Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
Note, further, that the D.C. Circuit court suggested in a case involving the World Bank 
that the Bank’s members only intended to waive its immunity from suit with respect to 
this latter category of persons, namely: “debtors, creditors, bondholders, and those other 
potential plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have subject itself to suit in order to achieve 
its chartered objectives. Since a waiver of immunity from employees’ suits arising out of 
internal administrative grievances is not necessary for the Bank to perform its functions 
… this immunity is preserved by the members’ failure expressly to waive it.” Mendaro v. 
World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 29. See H.G.R. v. FAO, Int’l Lab. Org. Admin. Trib. [hereinafter ILOAT], 
Judgment No. 3240 (Jul. 4, 2013).  
 30. See A. v. WTO, ILOAT, Judgment No. 3602 (Feb. 3, 2016). 
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decisions,31 to sexual harassment,32 to assault and battery,33 and, in one 
instance, to the bullying of a UN staff member, leading her to commit 
suicide in her Geneva residence.34 
This paper will critically evaluate the consistency of IGO internal 
justice mechanisms with the human right to a fair hearing. Part II of this 
paper will discuss IGO IJSs, focusing specifically on the WTO IJS, of 
which little is written about, while drawing appropriate comparisons with 
the UN system. Part III will discuss the right to a fair hearing, with a 
particular focus on the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR).35 Part IV will illustrate how European domestic courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have attempted to reconcile 
the right to a fair hearing with the immunities of IGOs. Part V will 
conclude with recommendations.  
II. INTERNAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
First, in this Part of the paper, I will discuss judgments of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and treaty provisions requiring IGOs 
to establish IJSs. Then, I will summarize material elements of the WTO 
and UN IJSs. I will also discuss IJS reform initiatives implemented a few 
  
 31. C.F. Amerasinghe, Problems Relating to Promotion in the Law of the 
International Civil Service, 51 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 923, 928 (1991). 
 32. Megan Felter, Meeting its Immunity Obligations: The United Nations and 
Employee Sexual Harassment Claims, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 41–51 (2011) 
(discussing Ms. Cynthia Brzak’s failed attempt to sue the United Nations in New York 
courts).  
 33. In re Rombach-Le Guludec, ILOAT, Judgment No. 1581 (Jan. 30, 1997). The 
appellant was allegedly battered by the European Patent Office (EPO) President, 
sustaining serious injuries that required her to be hospitalized. Id. The EPO refused to lift 
the President’s immunity to allow the Munich State Prosecutor to launch an investigation. 
Id. The ILOAT on that occasion declined jurisdiction on the basis that the matter affected 
relations between the EPO and a member state. Id. 
 34. In re Qin, ILOAT, Judgment No. 1752 (Jul. 9, 1998). A Chinese national was 
subjected to constant psychological harassment by ILO work colleagues, some of whom 
wrote a widely-circulated libelous petition to the Director of Personnel requesting that 
she be transferred out of her department. Id. She took her life on 14 December 1993. Id.
The ILO Director General’s Office (DGO) refused to permit the Swiss Procurer-General 
to enter the ILO premises to conduct an investigation. Id. The ILOAT refused to conduct 
an investigation to establish causation. Id.  
 35. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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years ago in the UN, before critically evaluating ongoing WTO IJS 
reforms. 
A. The Quid Pro Quo for Immunity. 
As touched upon in the introduction, IGOs are immune from suits in 
domestic courts.36 An IGO staff member’s only official recourse to 
justice is buried deep within the complex code of internal IGO law laid 
out in staff regulations, staff rules, and the staff member’s employment 
contract. In some instances, an IGO may not provide for any meaningful 
access to internal justice.37 The ICJ considered as early as 1954 that the 
creation of an IJS was essential towards remedying potentially grave 
injustices towards IGO staff: 
The Charter contains no provision which authorizes any of the principal 
organs of the United Nations to adjudicate upon these disputes, and 
Article 105 secures for the United Nations jurisdictional immunities in 
national courts. It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be 
consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom 
and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the 
United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford 
no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any 
disputes which may arise between it and them. In these circumstances, 
the Court finds that the power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as 
between the Organization and the staff members, was essential to 
ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give effect to the 
paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence and integrity. Capacity to do this arises by 
necessary intendment out of the Charter.38  
The ICJ was not asked to look beyond the UNC in its Advisory 
Opinion. Had it been asked to, it would surely have pointed out that the 
General P&I Convention directs the UN to:  
  
 36. See text at supra note 23. 
 37. For an example, which I discuss below in more detail, see Siegler v. Western 
European Union, Brussels Lab. Court of App., JT 617 (2004), ILDC 53 (2003). As I 
discuss below in more detail, the Labour Court found that the WEU IJS provided no 
mechanism for compelling the IGO to comply with adverse rulings. See infra pp. 385–92.  
 38. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 13, at 57, (July 13). 
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make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes 
arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to 
which the United Nations is a party; (b) Disputes involving any official 
of the United Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys 
immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General.39  
Indeed, in a later Advisory Opinion, the ICJ noted, on this provision, 
that:  
the question of immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue 
of compensation for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed 
by the United Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity. 
The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the 
damage arising from such acts. However, as is clear from Article VIII, 
Section 29, of the General Convention, any such claims against the 
United Nations shall not be dealt with by national courts but shall be 
settled in accordance with the appropriate modes of settlement that 
“[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for” pursuant to Section 
29.40 
The Court thus drew a link between the obligation of the UN to 
establish an alternative mode of dispute settlement, and preservation of 
its privileges and immunities. The Specialized P&I Convention contains 
an analogous dispute resolution provision.41 These treaty provisions 
underscore that the obligation of IGOs to provide staff with meaningful 
access to justice is not hortatory in nature. Rather, this represents the 
quid pro quo for the immunities enjoyed by IGOs.42 While the Court 
does not go as far as articulating that the absence of a dispute resolution 
procedure pursuant to Art. VIII, Section 29 of the General P&I 
Convention (or Art. IX, Section 31 of the Specialized P&I Convention) 
may result in an IGO being stripped of its immunity from suit in 
  
 39. General P&I Convention, supra note 17, art. VIII, § 29. 
 40. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶66 (Apr. 
29). 
 41. Specialized P&I Convention, supra note 20, art. IX, § 31. 
 42. As I will discuss below, the absence of such access to justice should allow 
domestic courts to accept jurisdiction in a staff member’s challenge against an IGO.  
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domestic courts for ensuing damage claims, the academic literature has 
interpreted the Court’s findings in this manner.43 
The UN responded to the ICJ’s 1954 Advisory Opinion by creating its 
IJS.44 Staff appeals submitted through the IJS could be appealed up to the 
UN Administrative Tribunal (now the UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT)), 
established earlier in 1949.45 Before discussing the WTO IJS below, it 
bears highlighting that many IGO IJSs, including that of the WTO, are 
generally modeled after this first iteration of the UN IJS, probably due to 
first mover effects.46 Typically, an IGO’s IJS will recognize the appellate 
jurisdiction of either the UNAT or the ILOAT,47 the latter having been 
established in 1946 as heir to the Administrative Tribunal of the League 
of Nations (ATLN).48  
For all practical purposes, UNAT and ILOAT are courts of last resort: 
although the ILOAT Statute allows an IGO to appeal an ILOAT ruling to 
the ICJ for a binding “Advisory” Opinion, where the IGO considered the 
ruling to be “vitiated by a fundamental fault in the procedure followed.”49 
The ICJ has previously interpreted this restricted ground of appeal as 
  
 43. August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas Weber, In the Shadow of Waite and 
Kennedy, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 59, 69 (2004). 
 44. G.A. Res. 957(X), at 30–31 (Nov. 8, 1955).  For an excellent account of the 
early history of the UN’s IJS, see ABDELAZIZ MEGZARI, THE INTERNAL JUSTICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 1945-2015 (2015).  
 45. G.A. Res. 351(IV), at 49 (Dec. 9, 1949). The UNAT website can be accessed 
here: Off. of Admin. of Jus., About UNAT, UN APPEALS TRIB. (last visited Apr. 30, 
2017), http://www.un.org/en/oaj/appeals/.   
 46. It is interesting to note that the WB, IMF, Inter-American Development 
Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Pan-American Union 
have all established roughly equivalent administrative tribunals. See Arnold Zack, 
Developing Standards of Workplace Justice Within International Organizations, AM. 
SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INT’L ORG. INT. GROUP REV. 44, 45 (Summer 2010) 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/documents/International%20Organizations%20Int
erest%20Group%20Review%20-%202010%20Issue.p.pdf.  
47. See Off. of Admin. of Jus., Jurisdiction, UN APPEALS TRIB. 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/appeals/jurisdiction.shtml [hereinafter UNAT Jurisdiction]; see 
also ILO Administrative Tribunal: Membership, ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/tribunal/membership/lang--en/index.htm [ILOAT Jurisdiction].  
 48. ILO Administrative Tribunal, ILO (last visited Apr. 30, 2017), 
http://www.ilo.org/tribunal/lang--en/index.htm.  
 49. Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor 
Organization art. XII, Oct. 9, 1946 (adopted and amended by the International Labour 
Conference) [hereinafter ILOAT Statute].     
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limited to errors of jurisdiction.50 Such appeals have seldom been lodged 
by IGOs. The UNAT, in contrast, had initially recognized the locus
standi of any appellant, IGO and interested UN member state to 
challenge a UNAT ruling before the ICJ on grounds of excess of 
jurisdiction, failure to exercise jurisdiction, any question of law relating 
to a UNC provision, or commission of a fundamental error in 
procedure.51 These grounds of appeal were, however, subsequently 
deleted following a Report of the Secretary General issued in October 
1994.52  
B. Internal Justice Systems. 
1. The WTO IJS 
This section introduces the WTO IJS. I focus on the WTO IJS for two 
reasons: first, precious little is publicly known about it. There is no good 
or principled reason for this aura of secrecy; there is nothing confidential 
or sensitive about the structure or organization of the WTO’s IJS, which 
emanates from WTO staff rules and regulations,53 and is based on the UN 
staff rules and regulations.54 The WTO is one of only two IGOs that 
  
 50. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made 
Against the UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. Rep. 156, 25 (Oct. 23). It bears 
mentioning that literature notes the ICJ as not being thrilled with its appellate jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis the UNAT and ILOAT, considering it anathematic to its otherwise inter-state 
character. See generally Rudolf Ostrihansky, Advisory Opinions of the International 
Court of Justice as Reviews of Judgments of International Administrative Tribunals, 17 
POL. Y.B. INT’L L. 101-21 (1988). 
 51. ILOAT Statute, art. XII (subsequently removed by amendment). 
 52. U.N. Secretary-General, Review of the Procedure Provided for Under Article 
11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.6/49/2 (Jan. 29, 1996). 
 53. Conditions of Service Applicable to the WTO Secretariat, WTO, Annex 2 
(Oct. 21, 1998) https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache 
:QokEXTk1rKgJ:https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/DirectDoc.aspx%3Ffilenam
e%3Dt%253A%252Fwt%252Fl%252F282.doc%26+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
(URL cached). 
 54. Staff Regulations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2014/2 (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7J4Q-
ghcmAAJ:www.un.org/hr_handbook/English/sourcedocuments_/03staffregulati_/fulltext/
fulltext.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (URL cached); U.N. Secretary-General, 
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systematically refuse to provide relevant data about its IJS.55 This is 
noted by the International Administrative Law Center for Excellence 
(IALCE), which compiles IGO data for publication on an annual 
Legitimacy Index hosted on the Council of Europe’s website.56 By 
introducing the WTO IJS, this paper seeks to fill an acknowledged gap in 
IGO accountability. 
Second, as mentioned above, the WTO IJS was based on a prior 
iteration of the UN IJS, and not on its restructured version. The UN IJS 
was comprehensively revised in 2008 after the UN General Assembly 
implemented some of the recommendations of the Panel on the Redesign 
of the UN system of administration of justice.57 The Redesign Panel had 
been established following widespread user dissatisfaction with the UN 
IJS.58 In an interesting parallel, the WTO IJS was itself the subject of a 
recent internal review by WTO staff in the framework of the WTO’s 
introspective “Strategic Review” evaluation.59 It will be interesting (but 
difficult60) to see how many of the Strategic Review Group’s 
recommendations the WTO adopts in the coming years. 
The WTO IJS is governed by specific chapters of the WTO Staff 
Regulations,61 Staff Rules62 and internal staff memoranda. The Staff 
Regulations contemplate that “[t]he paramount objective in the 
determination of conditions of service shall be to secure staff members of 
  
Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2014/1 (Jan. 
1, 2014). 
 55. The other IGO is the IAEA. INT’L ADMIN. LAW CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: LEGITIMACY 
INDEX 2015 6, n. 12, http://www.coe.int/T/AdministrativeTribunal/Source/ 
IJS_LegitimacyIndex2015_BrettonWoodsLaw.pdf [hereinafter IALCE Legitimacy 
Index]. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Rep. of the Redesign Panel on the U.N. System of Administration of Justice, 
¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006) [hereinafter Rep. of the Redesign Panel]. 
 58. See Press Release, Expert Panel on United Nations Internal Justice Submits 
Report to Secretary-General, Says Fundamental Overhaul Essential for Management 
Reform Success, U.N. Press Release ORG/1470 (July 20, 2006). 
 59. Working Group on Rules, Final Report, World Trade Organization (June 
2014). 
 60. Due to the organization’s culture of secrecy.  
 61. WTO Staff Regulations, issued pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 62. WTO Staff Rules, WTO Doc. OFFICE(11)/(54) (Nov. 18, 2011). 
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the highest standards of competence, efficiency and integrity and to meet 
the requirements of the WTO taking into account the needs and 
aspirations of the staff members.”63 Chapter 12 (Grievances and Appeals) 
of the Staff Regulations provides that “[t]he WTO shall provide for a 
conciliation procedure in an endeavor to resolve grievances submitted by 
staff members relating to their conditions of employment.”64 In ensuing 
disputes, “staff members have the right to due process, as set out in the 
Staff Rules.”65  
The Staff Rules contain more detailed provisions on the WTO IJS.66 A 
staff member seeking recourse to the system can only challenge two 
types of measures: performance-related disciplinary measures imposed 
upon him or her by the Director-General, or an “administrative decision.” 
Disciplinary measures, the first type of measure, can be appealed directly 
to the ILOAT.67 Administrative decisions, however, are subject to a more 
convoluted internal appeal process. While the term “administrative 
decision” is undefined, it is typically understood to relate to tangible 
action or inaction by or on behalf of the Administration that has some 
discernible legal consequences for the aggrieved staff member.68 Such 
  
 63. WTO Staff Regulations, supra note 61, at “Purpose and Scope.” 
 64. Id. at 12.1. 
 65. Id. at 12.2 (emphasis omitted). 
 66. WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, at r. 114. 
 67. Id. at r. 114.5(b). 
 68. The UNAT, whose findings are not directly relevant to the WTO, determined 
that “an ‘administrative decision’ is a unilateral decision taken by the administration in a 
precise individual case (individual administrative act), which produces direct legal 
consequences to the legal order . . . . Administrative decisions are therefore characterized 
by the fact that they are taken by the Administration, they are unilateral and of individual 
application, and they carry direct legal consequences. They are not necessarily written, as 
otherwise the legal protection of the employees would risk being weakened in instances 
where the Administration takes decisions without resorting to written formalities.” 
Andronov v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 
1157, ¶ V., U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/1157 (2004). 
  Five years later, the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT), created 
following 2007 reforms, opted for a more amorphous interpretation: “[g]iven the nature 
of the decisions taken by the administration, there cannot be a precise and limited 
definition of such a decision. What is or is not an administrative decision must be decided 
on a case by case basis and taking into account the specific context of the surrounding 
circumstances when such decisions were taken.” Teferra v. Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. UNDT/2009/090, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
UNDT/NBI/2009/018 (2009). While UNAT jurisprudence is not directly relevant to the 
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decisions should ideally be in writing, to better insulate complainants 
from having their requests denied for want of a cause of action.69  
While data on the number or the nature of administrative decisions 
made by WTO staff members that have been challenged resides solely 
within the Director-General’s Office (DGO), a review of those IJS 
appeals leading to ILOAT judgments reveals that these administrative 
decisions have previously related to alleged wrongful termination,70 
arbitrary reassignments,71 retaliatory performance evaluations,72 
disciplinary measures,73 failure to give notice of non-renewal of 
employment,74 denial of benefits,75 and harassment.76 It bears 
emphasizing, however, that only a few IJS appeals are appealed to the 
ILOAT.77 The examples cited in this paragraph thus contain a snapshot, 
at best, of the range of complaints lodged with the DGO since the 
WTO’s establishment in 1995. 
To challenge an administrative decision, a staff member must 
formally request that the Director-General “review” the contested 
decision within 40 working days of being notified of it.78 The system thus 
opens with an administrative review conducted by the DGO. If the DGO 
determines that the decision violates WTO rules, corrective action is 
  
WTO, appeals from the WTO are heard by the ILOAT, and the ILOAT considers UNAT 
decisions as persuasive authority.  
 69. The WTO does not maintain a record of IJS-related statistics. However, WTO 
Staff Council volunteers familiar with the IJS process have indicated to me in private 
conversations that the lack of written evidence of an “administrative decision” often leads 
to the DGO’s rejection of a staff member’s grievance.  
 70. A.P. v. WTO, Judgment No. 3010 (ILOAT July 6, 2011); R.K. v. WTO, 
Judgment No. 3122 (ILOAT July 4, 2012); C.A. v. WTO, Judgment No. 3602 (ILOAT 
Feb. 3, 2016). 
 71. J.M. v. WTO, Judgment No. 2226 (ILOAT July 16, 2003). 
 72. A.P. v. WTO, Judgment No. 3171 (ILOAT Feb. 6, 2013); V.L. v. WTO, 
Judgment No. 3486 (ILOAT June 30, 2015). 
 73. F.S. v. WTO, Judgment No. 2254 (ILOAT July 16, 2003). 
 74. M.G. v. WTO, Judgment No. 2531 (ILOAT July 12, 2006). 
 75. C.H. v. WTO, Judgment No. 2637 (ILOAT July 11, 2007); J.D. v. WTO, 
Judgment No. 2638 (ILOAT July 11, 2007); S.R.M. v. WTO, Judgment No. 2639 
(ILOAT July 11, 2007). 
 76. A.P. v WTO, Judgment No. 3170 (ILOAT Feb. 6, 2013).  
 77. This observation is based on the author’s personal experiences. 
 78. Framed as an “administrative decision.” WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, at 
r. 114.3(a). 
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taken and the matter is closed.79 This rarely occurs. In theory, the DGO is 
meant to engage in an independent fact-finding exercise to assess the 
complainant’s review request. In practice, the DGO legal counsel, 
usually a senior lawyer reassigned from the Legal Affairs Division, 
conducts this exercise by discussing the matter directly with the 
complainant’s divisional director—an individual who may be motivated 
to play down the matter for fear of being perceived as an ineffective 
manager or, worse still, be the very person whose actions the 
complainant is challenging.80 After the legal counsel has concluded his 
investigation, within the 40-day period, the DGO notifies the 
complainant, in writing, of its decision in the matter.81 No evidence from 
the DGO legal counsel’s investigation is shared with the staff member, 
nor is the staff member entitled to any disclosure under the IJS.82  
If the DGO deems the challenged action intra vires, the DGO 
endorses the action as its own, and stands behind it for the remainder of 
the process. The staff member can appeal the DGO decision, as a 
designated complainant, within 20 days, to the Joint Appeals Board 
(JAB),83 a specially convened three-member panel of senior staff 
members appointed, in essence, by the DGO.84 JAB proceedings should 
normally last no longer than 40 days, and are adversarial in nature.85 The 
  
 79. Arguably, in such instances, the Director-General would be free to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against the manager or supervisor concerned pursuant to the 
Disciplinary Measures provisions of Regulation 11. WTO Staff Regulations; WTO Staff 
Rules, supra note 62, r. 113. However, the link is not explicitly drawn between these two 
sets of rules.  
 80. This is corroborated by the assessment of the Working Group on Rules. See
Final Report of the Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, at r. 4.7.
 81. WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, r. 114.3(a). 
 82. The Staff Rules do not address the possibility of information-sharing or 
disclosure to the staff member concerned. In practice, the staff member is merely 
informed of the DGO’s final decision—often times affirming the contested decision. See
id. 
 83. WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, r. 114.5. 
 84. Staff Admin. Memorandum from the Joint Appeals Board of the WTO, art. 2, 
WTO Doc. OFFICE(00)/5 (Jan. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Staff Admin. Memo].The JAB 
makes decisions on a majority basis. Two of the JAB members are appointed by the 
DGO. One is appointed by the Staff Council. In situations where the two DGO-appointed 
JAB members are leaning in a given direction, it goes without saying that the Staff 
Council-appointed JAB member will remember on which side his bread is buttered. 
Likely for this reason, no JAB member has ever been known to dissent.  
 85. WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, r. 114.8(e). 
390 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.2  
DGO legal counsel represents the DGO.86 The complainant, on the other 
hand, will normally represent him or herself, unless the WTO Staff 
Association secures a staff volunteer willing and able to act on his or her 
behalf.87 It bears mentioning that, prior to an ILOAT ruling on the 
matter,88 successive DG Administrations have been reportedly 
disinclined to allow for such assistance.89 While the JAB rules 
contemplate the possibility of oral hearings,90 by convention proceedings 
are conducted exclusively in writing. The JAB receives a submission and 
rebuttal statement each from the disputants,91 and issues its 
recommendations to the DGO.92 
The JAB has no formal powers to compel witnesses or order 
discovery.93 Only the DGO wields such authority.94 If the DGO fails to 
  
 86. Peter Milthorp, The Meat in the Sandwich, in A HISTORY OF LAW AND 
LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 291, 297 (Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015). 
 87. Staff Rule 114.8(b) contemplates that “Staff members may arrange to have 
their appeal presented to the Joint Appeals Board on their behalf by a staff member of the 
WTO or of another international organization in Geneva.” Id. at r. 114.8(b). To the 
author’s knowledge, this provision is very much a dead letter: there is no standing list of 
volunteer IGO lawyers based in Geneva. Further, soliciting their assistance would 
arguably amount to a violation of Organizational Secrecy Undertakings (an internal 
document declaration that employees will not disclose sensitive organizational material to 
the public). Accordingly, a volunteer provided by the Staff Association is a complainant’s 
best and only option of representation.  
 88. A.P. v. WTO, Judgment No. 3170, ¶ 38 (ILOAT Feb. 6, 2013).  
 89. Milthorp, supra note 86, at 297. 
 90. Staff Admin. Memo, supra note 84, arts. 9 and 13. 
 91. Id. art. 9. 
 92. See generally id. art. 19. 
 93. Staff Rule 114.8(c) provides, somewhat ambiguously, that “[t]he Joint 
Appeals Board may call members of the staff who may be able to provide relevant 
information, and shall have access to all documents pertinent to the case.” See WTO Staff 
Rules, supra note 62, at r. 114.8(c). This provision does not articulate what 
consequences, if any, flow from a failure to answer the JAB’s “call.” 
 94. The Director-General of the World Trade Organization is responsible for 
supervising the administrative functions of the WTO. Because WTO decisions are made 
by member states (through either a Ministerial Conference or through the General 
Council), the Director-General has little power over matters of policy—his role is 
primarily advisory and managerial. The WTO DG and, by extension, the WTO 
Secretariat, do not have any official institutional role in shaping the WTO’s agenda or 
policies under the WTO Agreement. Except to the extent that the Director-General is the 
repository of all powers and duties vested in the secretariat, there has no clear and explicit 
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exercise this authority in the course of its initial review, it may be less 
inclined to engage in fact-finding in parallel with JAB proceedings. 
While the JAB may pose questions and seek written responses from any 
member of staff following the exchange of rebuttal statements between 
the complainant and DGO, cooperation informally depends on the 
acquiescence of the staff member’s divisional director, and there are no 
penalties for non-compliance.95 The JAB may draw adverse inferences 
where the complainant does not candidly respond to questions.96 
However, the JAB is known to be far less inclined to draw adverse 
inferences from the DGO’s refusal to provide information.97 Formally, 
the JAB’s mandate is limited to issuing “high quality” recommendations 
to the DGO, which the latter, acting on the advice of its legal counsel, is 
free to ignore.98  
Once the JAB has issued its recommendations, proceedings are 
closed. The JAB keeps a record of proceedings,99 but these are sealed off 
and stored as confidential. The IJS closes with a second level of 
administrative review, whereupon the Director-General essentially has 
  
listing or consolidation of his powers and functions, whether by the Ministerial 
Conference or by the General Council. These powers and functions remain scattered in 
various WTO legal texts and decisions of either the Ministerial Conference or the 
General Council, as do the rules that govern the exercise of such powers and functions. 
This situation leads to much ambiguity and vagueness with respect to the exercise by the 
WTO DG of his powers and functions.  KAREN KAISER ET AL., WTO – INSTITUTIONS AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 81–83 (2006). It follows that, while there are no explicit rules on 
the issue, any authority not conferred to a designated entity within the WTO, including 
authority to direct staff to give testimonies or depositions, reverts to the Director-General. 
See, for instance, Selection of the WTO Director-General: Some Points to Consider, 
SOUTH CENTRE (Jan. 2005), https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/AN_IG8_Selection-of-WTO-Director-General_EN.pdf. 
 95. Staff Admin. Memo, supra note 84, art. 14. 
 96. I base this on private conversations with colleagues at the WTO Secretariat 
who acted as Staff Council volunteers. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Staff Admin. Memo, supra note 84, art. 4(1). Given the confidential 
nature of the WTO IJS, further, the frequency by which the Director-General stands by 
the JAB’s recommendations is unknown to anyone outside of the Administration. 
 99. WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, at r. 114.8(f). Note that Rule 114.9(a) 
contemplates that the Staff Council is only entitled to receive a copy of the JAB report 
and the DGO’s final decision where both parties consent. Id. at r. 114.9(a). These 
documents are, in any event, heavily redacted, and do not allow the reader to get a real 
sense of the issues that arose in proceedings.  
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twenty working days to reconsider his previous decision.100 Where the 
DGO fails to communicate a final decision to the complainant, the 
Director-General is presumed to have affirmed his prior decision.101 It 
may come as no surprise that the DGO rarely, if ever, revisits its 
decisions, even on those rare occasions where the JAB may recommend 
that the DGO finds for the complainant or expresses reservations about 
specific aspects of the impugned administration action.102 The staff 
member can appeal the DGO’s final decision, on issues of law, to the 
ILOAT.103 The entire process, from the first challenge to the underlying 
administrative decision to the Director-General’s final decision, can take 
up to several years.  
2. The ILOAT 
The ILOAT was initially redesigned to serve exclusively as an 
appellate court for ILO staff complaints.104 Its judgments are publicly 
available on its website,105 and are, for the most part,106 final and binding 
on the parties. Since 1990, its jurisdiction has gradually expanded to 
cover over 60 international organizations today.107 As mentioned in the 
introduction, by some estimates, the ILOAT’s jurisdiction covers 
upwards of 40,000 international civil servants.108 Applicable law, under 
the ILOAT Statute, is limited to the terms of appointment and conditions 
  
 100. Id. at r. 114.9(a). 
 101. Id. at r. 114.9(b). It bears mentioning that this is an improvement over the UN 
system, where non-responses by the Secretary-General were not deemed implied 
decisions for some years, until the UNAT remedied this gap in Andronov v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 1157, ¶ V., U.N. Doc. 
AT/DEC/1157 (2004). Prior to this point, complainants were left in the lurch until the 
Secretary-General positively adopted a decision. 
 102. I base this on private conversations with colleagues at the WTO Secretariat 
who acted as Staff Council volunteers. 
 103. See ILOAT Statute, art. VII(1). 
 104. Off. Of Admin. of Jus., supra note 45. 
 105. After the names and identities of persons implicated are redacted.  
 106. Article XII of the ILOAT Statute provides very limited recourse to the 
International Court of Justice. 
 107. Sixty-two, to be precise. See ILO, Membership, http://www.ilo.org/tribunal/ 
membership/lang--en/index.htm. 
 108. Szalay, supra note 10. 
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of service relevant to the respondent organization concerned.109 Formally, 
this would seem to exclude other sources of law, although the ILOAT’s 
case law on this point has been inconsistent, at times alluding to its 
adherence to general principles of law110 and human rights,111 and at other 
times disavowing these sources of law.112  
Whether the ILOAT is truly independent is the subject of some 
debate. Skeptics highlight the fact that the ILOAT is financed through 
fees paid by its “client” organizations, on a per dispute basis.113 
Reportedly, six organizations account for over 61% of the ILOAT’s 
caseload, of which 20% feature the European Patent Office (EPO), and 
16% involve the World Health Organization (WHO).114 Defendant 
organizations thus “pay to play,” creating questions over whether or to 
what extent the judges who hear appeals against them function as their 
agents, or independent trustees.115 ILOAT judges, whose appointments 
are formally confirmed by the ILO Conference, are presented in the 
Conference by the ILO Director-General, who also advises the 
Conference on whether to renew judicial contracts for subsequent three-
year terms.116 This arguably renders such judges “contract judges,” 
whose renewal depends on the goodwill of the very organizations that 
  
 109. ILOAT Statute, art. II(1). 
 110. J.M.W. v. European Patent Org., Judgment No. 2292, ¶ 11 (ILOAT Feb. 4, 
2004) (equality before the law; see In re Bajaj, Judgment No. 2023, ¶ 10 (ILOAT Jan. 31, 
2001) (“equal pay for work of equal value”). 
 111. In re Awoyemi v. UNESCO, Judgment No. 1756, ¶ 3 (ILOAT July 9, 1988). 
 112. See In re Zhu, Judgment No. 1509, ¶¶ 14–16 (ILOAT July 11, 1996).  
 113. See ILOAT Statute, art. IX(2). 
 114. The other four IGOs are EUROCONTROL, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the European Southern 
Observatory. Reinisch & Weber, supra note 43, at 105. 
 115. For more on the distinction between agents and principals in the international 
adjudicatory context, see generally Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International 
Courts in their Political Context, 14(1) EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 33 (2008). Arguably, 
ILOAT judges would function closer to somewhat constrained agents under Alter’s 
framework.  
 116. ILOAT Statute, art. III(2). See Rep. by the Director-General on the 
Procedures of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization 
(ILOAT) in Particular those Relating to the Review of Judgments, ¶ 13, UNESCO Doc. 
152 EX/35 (Aug. 27, 1997) (on the role of the ILO DG vis a vis the appointment of 
judges); see also Staff Union of the EPO, Managing the ILO Administrative Tribunal’s 
Workload – Current Challenges and Possible Improvements, EUR. PATENT ORG. 7 
(2015), https://www.suepo.org/documents/42591/53727.pdf. 
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appear from time to time before them as respondents.117 Last, but not 
least, it is of some note that, whereas the ILOAT Registry is independent 
from the ILO’s legal service, its staff is nevertheless selected by and 
report to the ILO Director-General.118 The Registry is tasked with 
providing technical, factual and legal support to the judges, thus 
requiring its staff in effect to draft judgments.119 
Leaving aside the very real possibility of bias in the above 
description, the ILOAT’s staffing and other resources have not grown at 
a pace commensurate with its expanded jurisdiction. By some measure, it 
would take the ILOAT over 6 years to clear its backlog.120 As a result, 
the ILOAT struggles to meet its caseload.121 ILOAT proceedings, due to 
case backlog, further delays an already slow IJS process.122 During this 
time, ILOAT staff rush through records of pending cases, and draft 
hundreds of judgments, dismissing as many cases as possible on 
technicalities, and glossing over the finer points of those appellant 
submissions that it accepts.123 It is a common gripe among appellants that 
the judgments finally rendered contain anomalies, mischaracterizations 
and factual errors, and fail to address key claims and legal arguments.124  
  
 117. Geoffrey Robertson, ILOAT Reform, ILO ¶ 6, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/staffun/info/iloat/robertson.htm (last updated Nov. 22, 
2002). 
 118. August Reinisch & Christina Knahr, From the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal to the United Nations Appeals Tribunal – Reform of the Administration of 
Justice System within the United Nations, 12 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 453 (2008). 
See also the Rules of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organization, November 24, 1993 (as amended), Art. 2. 
 119. MEGZARI, supra note 44, at 69–70 (referencing ILO Proposed Budget for the 
Biennium 1986-1987, Supplement No. 6 (A/40/6), Vol. II, § 26).   
 120. Staff Union of the EPO, supra note 116, at 2.   
 121. Governing Body Report, Workload and Effectiveness of the Tribunal, ¶ 8, 
ILO Doc. GB.325/PFA/9/1(Rev.) (Oct. 15, 2015). 
 122. Id.  
 123. A point forcefully made in an open letter by the Geneva-based firm of 
Schwab, Flaherty & Associés. Letter from Edward Patrick Flaherty, External Counsel to 
Staff of the Eur. Patent Office, Schwab, Flaherty & Associés, to Guy Ryder, Dir.-Gen. of 
the ILO (Feb. 23, 2016), http://techrights.org/2016/03/19/ilo-surge-in-cases/. 
 124. See Edward Patrick Flaherty, Legal Protection in International Organizations 
– A Practitioner’s View, THE LAW OFFS. OF  EDWARD FLAHERTY AND SCHWAB FLAHERTY 
ET ASSOCIÉS (Feb. 7, 2012), http://flahertylawgroup.com/legal-protections/. 
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Applicable rules governing procedures before the ILOAT are 
threadbare. There are no provisions on discovery125 nor do procedures 
exist for submission of subpoenas.126 As a result, points of law on 
discovery cannot be raised before the ILOAT; nor can the Tribunal order 
interim relief. While witnesses are permitted to give written statements, 
cross-examination of these witnesses is not allowed.127 It is of some note 
that, since 1989, the ILOAT has declined to hold any oral hearings.128 It 
is also noted in the literature that the ILOAT applies a permissive 
standard of review to internal appeal board determinations.129 In light of 
these apparent shortcomings of the ILOAT system, the ILO Staff Union 
spearheaded reform efforts to drastically overhaul the ILOAT in 2002.130 
Though the ILO Staff Union pushed to include ILOAT reforms in the 
June 2003 Session of the ILO Government Body, its efforts were 
evidently rebuffed by the ILO DGO, with the result that, eventually, 
reform efforts were placed on the backburner.131 Parallel calls to reform 
the UN IJS, however, succeeded.  
Given the similarities between the ILOAT and UNAT,132 it is curious 
to note that UN efforts succeeded where ILOAT efforts failed. One key 
factor seems to be that, with the exception of the International Seabed 
Authority, stakeholders of the UN system are more “centralized” and, 
accordingly, better organized within the UN organizational framework.133 
Stakeholders of the ILOAT, in contrast, are dispersed across a diverse 
  
 125. Staff Union of the EPO, supra note 116, at 10. 
 126. Edward Patrick Flaherty & Sarah Hunt, Rule Without Law: Injustice at the 
United Nations? IO WATCH 1, 6 http://www.iowatch.org/FlahertyHuntGPQ.pdf. 
 127. Id. at 7. 
 128. See Flaherty, supra note 124. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See ILOAT Reform: London Resolution, ILO (adopted Sept. 28, 2002), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/staffun/info/iloat/londonres.htm. 
 131. See the Staff Union’s Summary Note, proposing a schedule for amending the 
ILOAT in 2003: Reform of the ILO Administrative Tribunal, ILO (2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/staffun/info/iloat/pdf/summary_note.pdf. 
 132. A UN study identified only three notable differences between the UNAT and 
ILOAT, relating to: (i) the selection and appointment of judges; (ii) the authority to order 
specific performance by unit heads; and (iii) compensation limitations. Rep. of the Joint 
Inspection Unit, Administration of Justice: Harmonization of the Statutes of the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal and the International Labor Organization 
Administrative Tribunal, 1-4, U.N. Doc. JIU/REP/2004/3 (2004). 
 133. Compare UNAT Jurisdiction with ILOAT Jurisdiction, supra note 47. 
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range of 60+ international organizations, with the influential defendant 
IGOs likely to have a vested interest in an inefficient appellate process.  
3. The UN IJS Reforms 
As noted above, the WTO IJS largely mirrored the old UN IJS,134 with 
the only notable structural distinctions being that the (WTO) DGO legal 
counsel’s corresponding role in the UN IJS was shared by various 
individuals across the Administrative Law Unit of the Office of Human 
Resources Management; disciplinary measures under the UN were first 
appealed to a Joint Disciplinary Committee (JDC); and all final appeals 
from the JDC and JAB were lodged to the UNAT.135 One notable feature 
of the UNAT, distinguishing it from the ILOAT, is that the UNAT, in 
any order directing specific performance in favor the appellant, is 
required at the same time to fix a measure of compensation not 
exceeding two years’ net base salary, which the Secretary-General can 
pay as an alternative to specific performance. This latter feature survived 
UN IJS reforms.136  
The Redesign Panel expressed concerns with a lack of equality of 
arms in the IJS, with staff members either representing themselves, or 
resigning themselves to sub-par representation from a staff volunteer.137 
The Panel noted, with further concern, that JAB members were, for the 
most part, appointed by the Secretary-General.138 The Panel found that 
these individuals generally lacked the requisite qualifications and were 
  
 134. For an excellent summary, featuring references to the Old Staff Rules see 
Rishi Gulati, The Internal Dispute Resolution Regime of the United Nations: Has the 
Creation of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and United Nations Appeals Tribunal 
Remedied the Flaws of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal?, 15 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. OF U.N. L. 490, 498–99 (2011).  
 135. The timelines also differed. Review requests, for instance, took 60 working 
days for the Secretary-General’s Office to process, as opposed to the 40 working days 
specified in the WTO Staff Rules. See WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62, at r. 114.3. 
 136. Compare Art. 10(1) of the UNAT Statute with Art. 9(1), which now allows 
the Tribunal to “order one or both” of the remedies, with damages in excess of two years’ 
salary contemplated in the most egregious of cases. G.A. Res. 59/283, Statute of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations (Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter UNAT 
Statute]. 
 137. See Rep. of the Redesign Panel, supra note 57, ¶¶ 100–06. 
 138. Id.  ¶ 63. 
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dilatory in the execution of their duties.139 Further, because the JAB 
shared a secretariat with the JDC, which handled comparatively more 
pressing matters, JAB proceedings took much longer to process.140 The 
Panel noted that the Secretary-General paid scant attention to the JAB’s 
recommendations, ignoring even those rare recommendations 
unanimously finding in favor of complainants.141 The process, from 
challenge of the underlying administrative decision to the Secretary-
General’s final decision, typically lasted up to three years.142  
UNAT proceedings added an extra two years to this timetable.143 The 
Panel expressed grave concerns with the lack of oral hearings held by the 
UNAT.144 The Panel also questioned the impartiality of judges selected 
from a pool of Member State-proposed candidates,145 and observed a 
systemic lack of quality or internal coherence in those reports ultimately 
issued by the UNAT.146 The Panel recommended that the JDC and JAB 
be scrapped altogether, and that the UNAT be fundamentally 
overhauled.147 The Panel recommended that these two bodies be replaced 
with a two-tiered system comprised of a first-instance decentralized 
tribunal composed of professionally qualified judges, from which 
appeals on issues of law could be lodged to a standing appellate 
tribunal.148  
  
 139. Id.  ¶ 68. 
 140. Id.  ¶ 66. 
 141. Id.  ¶ 68. 
 142. See id. ¶¶ 65–68. The Panel did not specifically address the Secretary-
General’s compliance with JDC reports, nor did it indicate average length of disciplinary 
appeals. 
 143. Rep. of the Redesign Panel, supra note 57, ¶ 69. 
 144. Id.  ¶ 10. 
 145. Id.  ¶ 128. 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 62–72. 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 74, 87. 
 148. It is of note that the Redesign Panel acknowledged, id. ¶ 96, that the creation 
of this two-tier system would, at least formally, render harmonization between the 
ILOAT and UNAT more difficult, given that the UNAT would function as an appeal 
court whereas the ILOAT would remain (at least in label) an administrative tribunal. The 
Panel nevertheless considered that the UNAT would have the same powers to make 
orders as UNDT, which would function closer to the ILOAT equivalent under the 
proposed revisions. See also G.A. Res. 59/283, ¶ 49(c)(vii) (June 2, 2005) (requiring the 
Redesign Panel to “[r]eview the functioning of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal and examine the further harmonization of its statute and that of the International 
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The Panel further recommended that the first-instance tribunal be 
empowered to exercise jurisdiction over: complaints alleging non-
compliance with the terms of appointment; conditions of employment or 
the duties of the IGO towards its staff; disciplinary matters; applications 
by IGOs, or the funds and programs thereof, to enforce relevant financial 
accountability rules; and actions by a staff association on behalf of its 
members to enforce staff rules and regulations on behalf of a class of its 
members.149 In so doing, the Panel seemed to recommend broadening the 
scope of the IJS beyond challenges to disciplinary measures and 
administrative decisions. Unfortunately, this particular recommendation 
was not adopted.150 
Many of the Panel’s recommendations were endorsed by the 
Secretary-General in a report proposing IJS changes to the General 
Assembly,151 and the General Assembly duly passed a resolution 
operationalizing these proposed changes in 2008.152 While these changes 
did not fully capture all of the Panel’s recommendations, they were 
certainly more than cosmetic. The JAB was scrapped and replaced at the 
first instance with the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT).153 
Parties may now appeal UNDT decisions to the UNAT where parties 
allege that the UNDT either failed to exercise or exceeded its jurisdiction 
or competence, erred on a question of law, committed an error in 
procedure, or erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly 
unreasonable decision.154 Challenges to administrative decisions are no 
  
Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal with a view to further professionalizing the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal.”).  
 149. Rep. of the Redesign Panel, supra note 57, ¶¶ 74–77. 
 150. Art. 2(1) of the UNDT Statute empowers the Tribunal to hear applications: 
“(a) To appeal an administrative decision that is alleged to be in non-compliance with the 
terms of appointment or the contract of employment. The terms “contract” and “terms of 
appointment” include all pertinent regulations and rules and all relevant administrative 
issuances in force at the time of alleged noncompliance; (b) To appeal an administrative 
decision imposing a disciplinary measure.” G.A. Res. 63/253, annex, Statute of the 
United Nations Dispute Tribunal, art. 2(1)(a), (b) (Dec. 24, 2008) [hereinafter UNDT 
Statute]. 
 151. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations 
System of Administration of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/61/758 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 152. G.A. Res. 61/261, ¶ 4 (Apr. 30, 2007), later aff’d by G.A. Res 62/228 (Feb. 6, 
2008) and G.A. Res. 63/253 (Mar. 17 2009). 
 153. See generally UNDT Statute. 
 154. UNAT Statute, art. 2(1).  
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longer lodged with the Secretary-General’s Office (SGO), nor does the 
SGO retain the right to revisit any final decision at the close of internal 
administrative proceedings.155 Complaints are instead lodged as requests 
for a management evaluation to an independent organizational entity 
operating within the Management Evaluation Unit.156 To remedy the 
“equality of arms”157 concern expressed by the Panel, the General 
Assembly created the Office of Staff Legal Assistance to provide legal 
advisory services to staff members throughout the entirety of 
proceedings.158 Timetables were otherwise shortened, and complaint 
procedures streamlined for staff operating in or away from headquarters.  
Judicial independence was significantly bolstered. An Internal Justice 
Council composed of distinguished lawyers was established to, inter 
alia, source suitable judicial candidates for the UNDT and UNAT.159 
Eligible candidates must be of high moral character, and have at least 10 
years of relevant work experience for appointment to the UNDT and 15 
years for the UNAT.160 Appointments are all offered on non-renewable 
terms of seven years.161 Rules of procedure have also been improved. 
The UNDT Rules contemplate that oral hearings “shall normally be 
held” in appeals against disciplinary measures.162 The UNDT and UNAT 
Rules otherwise remain more nuanced regarding oral hearings in appeals 
against administrative decisions.163 In terms of remedies, it is worth 
noting that the Tribunals can award costs against a party that has abused 
  
 155. U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Transitional Measures 
Related to the Introduction of the New System of Administration of Justice, ¶ 1.3, U.N. 
Doc. ST/SGB/2009/11 (June 24, 2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. The Redesign Panel considered, in this respect, that the theoretical right to be 
represented by a lawyer does not remedy the practical difficulties of actually obtaining 
effective legal representation in IJS proceedings. See U.N. Secretary General, supra note 
151, at 5.  
 158. See G.A. Res. 62/228, supra note 152, ¶ 13. 
 159. Id. ¶ 37. 
 160. UNDT Statute, art. 4(3); UNAT Statute, art. 3(3). 
 161. UNDT Statute, art. 4(4); UNAT Statute, art. 3(4). 
 162. See G.A. Res. 64/119, art. 16, ¶ 2 (Jan. 15, 2010). 
 163. See id. art. 16, ¶ 1 and see also id. annex, Rules of Procedure of the United 
Nations Appeals Tribunal, art. 18, which consider that the Tribunals “may hold oral 
hearings.” 
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proceedings.164 As mentioned above, the option of compensation in lieu 
of specific performance has been retained.165 
4. A Note on WTO Reforms 
In the summer of 2014, the WTO Director-General announced the 
start of an internal review of various staff-related functions of the 
WTO.166 This so-called “Strategic Review” focused, broadly, on 
Management, Mobility, Promotions, and Rules. The Rules Working 
Group, composed of various mid to high-level WTO staff members, 
focused specifically on “the need to restore the ‘rule of law’ in the 
management and administration of the secretariat.”167 Curiously, this 
document makes no mention of the Redesign Panel’s findings and 
recommendations, let alone the UN IJS reforms.  
The lack of reference to the UN IJS reforms efforts is odd, given that 
the reforms sought to remedy important gaps in the system that the WTO 
essentially copied, with little to no modifications of note. 
Recommendations of the Rules Working Group focused on: (i) 
circumscribing the role of the DGO legal counsel, by dividing his role 
between at least two individuals, both subordinated to the Legal Affairs 
Division, the equivalent to the UN Administrative Law Unit;168 (ii) 
remedying the inequality of arms apparent in the system by guaranteeing 
a right to staff assistance;169 (iii) requiring the administration to provide a 
statement of reason where it makes an administrative decision, setting 
out all relevant findings, including material questions of fact, relevant 
evidence, and applicable rules and policies;170 (iv) creating an 
independent role for the conduct of the first level of administrative 
review, with the officer so charged being bound to “objectively assess” 
the administrative decision, notably, by reviewing the factual basis for 
  
 164. UNDT Statute, art. 10(6); UNAT Statute, art. 9(2).  
 165. UNDT Statute, art. 10(5); UNAT Statute, art. 9(1). The argument is made, 
however, that Courts normally refrain from ordering specific performance in the case of 
contracts for personal services. See Gulati, supra note 134, at 522. 
 166. See WTO Comm. on Budget, Fin. & Admin., Report of the Meeting Held on 
2 July 2014, ¶¶ 2.1–2.4, WTO Doc. WT/BFA/143 (July 15, 2014). 
 167. Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, ¶ 1.1. 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 4.7–4.8. 
 169. Id. ¶ 4.19. 
 170. Id. ¶ 4.50. 
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the decision, the applicable rules and policies, the motivations, authority 
and interpretations for/of the decision, and the relevant procedural 
requirements, including an assessment of whether due process was 
respected in making the decision;171 (v) loosening time limits for staff 
members seeking to challenge an administrative decision;172 (vi) creating 
a formal right for the JAB to compel witnesses or order discovery;173 (vii) 
publishing JAB reports in a WTO Gazette;174 (viii) establishing the locus
standi for the staff council to file an amicus brief in an appeal;175 and (ix) 
creating a Joint Disciplinary Body (JDB) to handle internal appeals 
against disciplinary measures.176  
The WTO Working Group’s proposals are more modest than the UN 
Redesign Panel’s recommendations, though there are some clear 
overlapping concerns: both the Redesign Panel and the Working Group 
expressed concerns relating to delays; inequality of arms; the partiality of 
the DGO legal counsel/UN Administrative Law Unit; and the need for 
stronger rules for discovery and depositions.177 The similarities, however, 
end there.  
The Working Group report falls considerably short of the Redesign 
Panel’s recommendations in two important respects. First, the Working 
Group would have the DGO retain residual control of the IJS.178 The UN, 
in contrast, delegated oversight of its IJS to an entity operating within the 
Department of Management.179 Until the DGO divests itself of its role in 
the IJS, staff members will continue to hesitate to lodge a request for 
review that will, in all likelihood, be defended by the DGO.180 
  
 171. Id. ¶ 4.60. 
 172. Id. ¶ 4.61. 
 173. Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, ¶ 4.70 
 174. Id. ¶¶ 4.85, 6.26. 
 175. Id. ¶¶ 4.87–4.89. 
 176. Id. ¶ 4.130. 
 177. Though the Working Group report is otherwise silent on the issue of oral 
hearings. See generally id. 
 178. Inasmuch as the Report does not address the need for the need for a 
Ministerial Declaration clarifying the scope of these powers. For more on this issue, see
supra note 94. 
 179. U.N. Secretariat, supra note 155, § 1.3. 
 180. Following which the staff member concerned may be subjected to retaliatory 
evaluations and, possibly, dismissal.  
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Second, the Working Group falls well short of the Redesign Panel in 
taking a far more favorable view of the JAB, thereby further allowing the 
DGO to continue operating in the background. This is unfortunate, but 
unsurprising, given the strong representation of former and current JAB 
members in the Rules Working Group.181 The Working Group’s 
recommendation to retain the JAB and create a JDB to oversee 
disciplinary measures is a significant departure from the Redesign 
Panel’s recommendation that such bodies be scrapped in favor of an 
independent first-instance tribunal akin to that of the UNDT. The JAB 
and JDB will continue to operate under allegations of bias and partiality 
for as long as the DGO retains the power to appoint a majority of 
appointees to each body. It bears mentioning, in this respect, that 
inasmuch as the Redesign Panel expressed concerns with the 
independence and impartiality of JAB and JDC members in the context 
of an IGO composed of some 40,000 employees,182 such concerns should 
surely be amplified in the context of the WTO’s 634 staff members,183 
where JAB and JDC members are more likely to fraternize outside the 
office with fellow divisional directors and managers.  
Deficiencies notwithstanding, the status of the Working Group report 
is itself uncertain. As an internal document distributed to WTO staff 
members within the framework of the Director-General’s Strategic 
Review, it has no binding force of law. Nor is the report, as an internal 
work product, to be shared with WTO Member States. The DGO is free 
to disregard it, or cherry-pick among those recommendations to retain 
only those that it deems palatable. Whenever the DGO opts to amend the 
IJS, it will likely have to present these amendments to the WTO General 
Council for adoption in the form of revised Staff Rules and Regulations. 
If none are adopted in the coming years, it can be presumed that the 
DGO opted to ignore the Working Group’s recommendations.  
III. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 
Below, I discuss the treaty and customary international law elements 
of the right to a fair hearing. I then summarize how the ECtHR has 
  
 181. Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, at 3, n. 2. 
 182. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 9.  
 183. WTO, supra note 6.  
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interpreted the right to a fair hearing over the past four decades, before 
critically evaluating the consistency of the WTO and UN IJSs with the 
relevant ECtHR jurisprudence.  
A. General Instruments. 
The right to a fair hearing encompasses procedural elements that 
require trials to be conducted fairly, publicly, and in an expedient 
manner. While this paper focuses on the civil context of the right to a fair 
hearing, it bears noting that, in the criminal context, the right is 
understood to codify certain minimum guarantees, including the right of 
the accused to be intelligibly informed of the nature and causes of the 
charges against him or her, the right to have adequate time and facilities 
to prepare his or her defense, the right to legal counsel, the right to call 
and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.184 
The right to a fair hearing, in its post-World War manifestation, can 
be traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).185 
One provision, in particular, considers that: “[e]veryone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him.”186 The UDHR, while formally a non-
binding declaration, has potentially acquired the status of customary 
international law.187 Furthermore, its provisions have been incorporated 
into various national constitutions and regional human rights 
instruments.188  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a 
binding instrument, provides in part that “[i]n the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at 
  
 184. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL? A 
BASIC GUIDE TO LEGAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE (Mar. 2000), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fair_trial.pdf. 
 185. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 5, 9, 
10, 11 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 186. Id. art. 10.  
 187. See generally Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995-
1996). 
 188. Id. at 292–312. 
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law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”189  
This provision has been frequently cited before and interpreted by the 
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC).190 A draft protocol to the ICCPR 
proposed that this provision be included in the list of non-derogable 
rights specified in the ICCPR.191 That this proposal failed to gain 
necessary traction does not detract from the fundamental nature of this 
right. In a General Comment, the HRC stated the following in this 
regard:  
While article 14 is not included in the list of non-derogable rights of 
article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, States derogating from normal 
procedures required under article 14 in circumstances of a public 
emergency should ensure that such derogations do not exceed those 
strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation. The 
guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of 
derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable 
rights. Thus, for example, as article 6 of the Covenant is non-derogable 
in its entirety, any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty 
during a state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the 
Covenant, including all the requirements of article 14. Similarly, as 
article 7 is also non-derogable in its entirety, no statements or 
confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this 
provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by 
article 14, including during a state of emergency, except if a statement 
or confession obtained in violation of article 7 is used as evidence that 
torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred. 
  
 189. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 190. For a good (but dated) overview, see LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 184, at 12. 
 191. Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Rep. on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, The Administration of Justice and the 
Human Rights of Detainees, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24, annex I, Draft Third 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at 
Guaranteeing Under All Circumstances the Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy (June 3, 
1994). 
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Deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the 
presumption of innocence, is prohibited at all times.192 
B. ECHR 
1. The European Context 
In addition to the above two general instruments, the right to a fair 
hearing has been codified in various regional human rights 
instruments.193 Below, I discuss its application in the European context. I 
focus on Europe for two reasons: first, the practice of regional treaty 
bodies on the scope of the right to a fair hearing has been relatively 
uniform.194 Accordingly, much of what is discussed in the context of the 
ECHR applies in a broader context. Regional treaty bodies do not operate 
in isolation from one another, and sometimes consult ECtHR decisions 
when adjudicating upon analogous claims.195  
Second, Europe is host to a large number of IGOs. As I will discuss in 
the following part of this paper, this has prompted a number of IGO staff 
members to appeal to the ECtHR pursuant to the theory that 
transgressions committed by IGOs towards their staff ultimately 
implicates the host state’s human rights obligations. Such appeals have 
prompted the ECtHR to develop case law specific to the fair hearing 
rights of IGO staff. Before discussing this case law in the following 
section, it is useful to first discuss the scope of the right to a fair hearing 
under the ECHR.  
  
 192. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to 
Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 
(Aug. 23, 2007) (citations omitted). 
 193. See, notably, Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights arts. 8(1), 27(2) Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
[hereinafter American Convntion]; see also Organization of African Unity, African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 7(1), 26, June 27, 1981, 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].  
 194. See IALCE Legitimacy Index, supra note 55, at 7–9. 
 195. While these bodies may seldom explicitly refer to each other, there is 
something of a “muted dialogue” between them. For a more in depth discussion of the 
phenomenon of muted dialogue between supranational courts, see generally Marco 
Bronckers, From ‘Direct Effect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’: Recent Developments in the 
European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO and Beyond, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 885 (2008). 
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2. Elements of the Right to a Fair Hearing 
The right to a fair hearing, in the ECHR, is drafted in near-identical 
terms to the corresponding provision of the ICCPR. The relevant 
provision contemplates, in part, that “[i]n the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”196 The concept of 
“civil rights and obligations” is not to be interpreted solely in relation to 
the respondent state’s domestic laws. Rather, it is an autonomous concept 
derived from the Convention.197  
The Convention does not further define the applicable “civil rights 
and obligations.” These rights should generally be recognized in 
domestic law.198 “Whether a person has an actionable domestic claim 
depends not only on substantive [rights]” or obligations at issue, as 
defined in domestic law, but extends to “the existence [or absence] of 
procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of” obtaining 
relief before domestic courts.199 The ECtHR established years ago that 
employment disputes implicate civil rights and obligations, regardless of 
whether the employer concerned is a private entity200 or a public body.201 
Further, the nature of such disputes need not concern purely pecuniary 
matters. The ECHR has previously recognized that such disputes may 
seek to preserve the appellant’s right to life, health, or a healthy work 
environment.202 The ECtHR has established limited categories of 
disputes that are excluded from the scope of the right to a fair hearing.203 
None of these are relevant to IGO staff disputes. 
  
 196. ECHR, art. 6(1). 
 197. Georgiadis v. Greece, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 9. 
 198. Masson v. Netherlands, App. No. 30/1994,  22 E.H.R.Rep. 491, 504 (1995). 
 199. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 15. 
 200. Buchholz v. Germany, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1981). 
 201. Pellegrin v. France, 31 E.H.R.Rep. 26, 651–52 (2001). 
 202. Taúkn v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26. 
 203. These exclusions include tax and immigration proceedings, in addition to 
political rights. Further, the ECtHR has previously recognized that disputes relating to 
certain classes of public servants can fall outside Art. 6(1) of the ECHR where national 
law explicitly excludes access to a court for these classes of public servants, and such 
exclusion can be justified on objective grounds in the state’s interests. Eskelinen v. 
Finland, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 20.  
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Where the right to a fair hearing applies, litigants must have an 
effective judicial remedy to enable them to assert their underlying 
rights.204 This implicates a right of access to a court or tribunal.205 This 
right of access, which extends beyond the right to initiate proceedings to 
seek a determination, must be practical and effective.206 This notably 
requires that individuals have “a clear, practical opportunity to challenge 
an act that is an interference with [their] rights.”207 While the right of 
access may be subject to reasonable limitations, these limitations cannot 
operate to impair the very essence of the right.208 Such impairment could 
result from prohibitively high costs of proceedings, unreasonably short 
time limits, or the existence of any other procedural bar preventing or 
limiting the possibilities of seeking judicial relief.209 
The court or tribunal must be one “established by law.”210 The ECtHR 
has interpreted this requirement to apply beyond the formal legal basis 
for the existence of judicial organs, to matters relating to judicial 
composition.211 The Court previously considered that the practice of 
tacitly renewing judges’ terms of office following expiration of their 
terms of office, and pending reappointments, ran counter to the spirit of 
the right to a fair hearing.212  
Judicial organs must be “independent and impartial.”213 Independence 
implicates the notion of separation of powers, and requires that the 
organs in question operate outside of other branches of government.214 
Independence further requires that courts and their officers operate free 
from the influence of the litigants.215 Impartiality, which the ECtHR 
  
 204. Beles v. Czech Republic, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49. 
 205. Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 524, 14 (1975). 
 206. Bellet v. France, 333-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1995). 
 207. Id. at 15. 
 208. Philis v. Greece, 209 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1991). 
 209. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14–15 (2013) [hereinafter GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6]. 
 210. ECHR, art. 6(1).  
 211. Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 55 (1981). 
 212. Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37–38. 
 213. ECHR, art. 6(1).  
 214. Beaumartin v. France, 296-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 38 (1994). 
 215. Sramek v. Austria, 84-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1984). 
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assesses through a subjective and objective assessment, denotes the 
absence of prejudice or bias.216 
Judicial organs must be capable of issuing binding decisions. Such 
decisions must compel compliance in full,217 and may not be altered by a 
non-judicial authority, particularly where such alteration operates to the 
detriment of an individual party (as distinct from a state entity).218 The 
power to issue advisory opinions, further, is insufficient, irrespective of 
whether such opinions are followed most of the time.219 These organs 
must have “full jurisdiction”220 to examine all relevant questions of fact 
and law.221 Accordingly, the refusal by such bodies to rule independently 
on factual matters that are critical to the settlement of a dispute falls short 
of the “full jurisdiction” threshold.222  
The ECtHR has repeatedly emphasized the importance of ensuring a 
fair balance between the parties, wherein each party is afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present its case.223 The denial of legal 
representation can result in the deprivation of a party’s fair hearing 
rights, particularly against an opponent with deeper pockets.224 It should 
be noted that the ECtHR’s assessment of fairness applies to the 
proceedings as a whole. Accordingly, shortcomings at an earlier level 
can be rectified at a later stage.225  
The right to a fair hearing requires judicial organs “to conduct a 
proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence” 
produced by the litigants.226 In proceedings between an appellant and an 
administrative authority the judicial organ must ensure that the appellant 
has access to all relevant documents in the possession of the authority by 
compelling disclosure where necessary.227 Further, trials should generally 
  
 216. Micallef v. Malta, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93. 
 217. Hornsby v. Greece, 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 15.  
 218. Van de Hurk v. Netherlands, 288 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1994). 
 219. Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 40 (1985). 
 220. Beaumartin v. France, 296-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 38 (1994). 
 221. Woningen v. Netherlands, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 16. 
 222. See id.  
 223. Beheer v. Netherlands, 274 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1993). 
 224. Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 26. 
 225. Helle v. Finland, 1997-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54. 
 226. Perez v. France, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 21. 
 227. McGinley v. United Kingdom, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, 27. 
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be open to the public.228 This is to protect litigants against the 
administration of justice behind closed doors, absent public scrutiny.229At 
a minimum this implies a right to an oral hearing before at least one 
instance, and requires that judgments, insofar as they are not publicly 
delivered, are nevertheless publicly accessible.230 Last, but not least, 
while the ECtHR allows litigants to waive the right to a public hearing, 
such waiver must be clear and unequivocal.231  
3. Assessing the IJSs 
It is clear that the WTO IJS, whether or not it fully incorporates the 
Working Group’s recommendations, falls short of providing its staff an 
ECHR-compliant right to a fair hearing. WTO staff may only challenge 
disciplinary measures or administrative decisions. They are thus 
procedurally barred from seeking judicial determination of a wide range 
of civil rights and obligations. For instance, they have no right of access 
to seek remedies in relation to matters such as the DGO’s non-
compliance with the terms of their appointment, or general issues 
relating to the conditions of their employment. Nor can they otherwise 
compel the DGO to abide by its duties and responsibilities towards its 
staff. Such challenges have previously been considered to fall outside the 
scope of an “administrative decision”232 for want of being of “individual 
applicability.” These challenges would thus seem to fall into a legal void.  
In addition, strict time limits of 40 days233 do not allow a prospective 
complainant much time to seek out a staff volunteer and prepare a 
request for review. For those measures and decisions that can be litigated 
in a timely manner through the IJS, it is difficult to identify where in the 
process a complainant is granted access to an independent and impartial 
tribunal. The DGO is clearly not such a body. Neither is the JAB, which 
  
 228. Unless the circumstances of the case warrant a private hearing. Martinie v. 
France, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 21. 
 229. GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6, supra note 209, at 46. 
 230. Fischer v. Austria, 312 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1995). 
 231. See Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981). 
 232. See the discussion of the Andronov judgment, supra notes 68-69. 
 233. See supra note 78. The Working Group recommended that this be extended. 
The Working Group recommended that this be extended. Working Group on Rules, supra 
note 59, ¶ 4.61. 
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cannot issue binding decisions.234 Leaving this important limitation aside 
for a moment, even if we assume that JAB members are well-intentioned 
in the execution of their duty, the JAB is nevertheless not vested with 
“full jurisdiction” to review all pertinent issues of fact and law.235 
Notably, the JAB has no formal powers to compel discovery or depose 
witnesses.236 Nor do complainants have the right to be heard by the 
JAB.237 The JAB can only issue recommendations to the DGO, which 
can act on them, but will be disinclined to do so in an adversarial 
setting.238 Finally, the disparity in the form of legal assistance available 
to staff relative to the professional lawyers staffed in the DGO reveals a 
glaring inequality of arms.239 Even if we assess fairness in relation to the 
process as a whole, the ILOAT does not rebalance the inequities in the 
system.  
The fact that ILOAT judges seeking reappointments serve as contract 
judges arguably falls short of the requirement that the ILOAT be 
“established by law.”240 Assuming, arguendo, that this flaw is not fatal to 
such a determination, the fact remains that the ILOAT is funded by 
respondent IGOs on a per-dispute basis.241 In addition, its Registry, 
tasked with briefing the judges and drafting judgments, reports directly 
to the ILO DGO,242 a frequent respondent.243 In sum, the structure of the 
ILOAT raises doubts as to its independence and impartiality. Moreover, 
it is unlikely that the ILOAT is itself vested with full jurisdiction to 
resolve a complainant’s appeal, given that it is typically not in the 
business of seeking out evidence or deposing witnesses.244 That it has not 
  
 234. See generally Van de Hurk v. Netherlands, 288 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 
(1994). 
 235. See generally Woningen v. Netherlands, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16. 
 236. See WTO Staff Rules, supra note 62. The Working Group recommended that 
the JAB be given such powers. See Working Group on Rules, supra note 59. 
 237. See Staff Admin. Memo, supra note 84, art. 13. 
 238. Id. arts. 17–18. 
 239. See generally Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. The Working 
Group recommended that the staff be “guaranteed” assistance, although this presumably 
will remain assistance by staff volunteers. See Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, ¶ 
4.19. 
 240. See Reinisch & Knahr, supra note 118, at 462. 
 241. See ILOAT Statute, art. IX(2). 
 242. Flaherty, supra note 124; see Robertson, supra note 117. 
 243. See text accompanying supra note 114. 
 244. See supra sec. II, “The ILOAT.” 
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held oral hearings in almost 30 years, notwithstanding any clear and 
unequivocal waivers from complainants,245 further deprives such 
complainants of an important fair hearing element.246  
The reformed UN IJS comes closer to meeting the ECHR’s fair 
hearing requirements. Two developments in particular have led to more 
fairness in the proceedings: divestment of the Secretary-General’s role to 
the independent entity operating within the Department of 
Management,247 and the creation of the Office of Staff Legal 
Assistance.248 That the SGO no longer intervenes in the IJS in an 
adversarial capacity may encourage staff to more candidly pursue 
complaints with the entity housed by the Department of Management. 
Further, legal assistance provided by the Office of Staff Legal Assistance 
should, hopefully, be at least on par with that of the Administrative Law 
Unit. 
The UNDT, which replaced the discredited JDC and JAB peer review 
system, seems more likely to exercise “full jurisdiction.”249 Further, the 
process of judicial selection for UNDT and UNAT judges has been 
vastly improved.250 In addition, that the UNDT and UNAT, at least in 
disciplinary measures, have signaled a greater disposition towards 
conducting oral hearings is a welcome development.251 Whether or not 
these tribunals actually engage with their fact-finding powers by ordering 
discovery and deposing witnesses to plug whatever factual gaps remain 
on appeal remains to be seen.  
The UN IJS still contains some important flaws. Like the WTO IJS, 
access to the UN IJS remains limited to challenges against disciplinary 
measures and administrative decisions. For UN staff, all of those civil 
rights and obligations that cannot be pigeonholed into these two 
categories of measures thereby also fall into a legal void. The Redesign 
Panel recommended that actionable measures be broadened, but its calls 
were ignored.252 Further, one could conceivably make the argument that 
  
 245. Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). 
 246. Id.; Flaherty, supra note 124. 
 247. U.N. Secretariat, supra note 155, § 1.3. 
 248. See G.A. Res. 61/261, supra note 138. 
 249. See generally Woningen v. Netherlands, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 250. See G.A. Res. 62/228, supra note 152. 
 251. See text accompanying supra notes 162–163. 
 252. See text accompanying supra notes 149–150. 
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neither the UNDT nor the UNAT arguably issue truly “binding” 
decisions, in light of the Secretary-General’s continued ability to pay 
compensation in lieu of specific performance.253 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING TO IGO STAFF 
Below, I discuss previous efforts by IGO staff members to seek access 
to European domestic courts and the ECtHR, almost always in the 
context of an unfair dismissal. These staff members all argued that the 
courts’ failure to exercise jurisdiction would deprive them of their right 
to a fair hearing. As access to the ECtHR is conditional upon a 
complainant’s exhaustion of local remedies, I first discuss why this 
requirement is inapposite in the context of an appeal from an IGO IJS, 
before discussing how European domestic courts have dealt with the 
exercise of their jurisdiction. I then turn to the seminal decisions of the 
ECtHR on IGO staff members’ right of access to a fair hearing in the 
ECHR context, before critically evaluating how European courts have 
since implemented these decisions. 
A. The Requirement to Exhaust Local Remedies. 
The ECHR requires applicants to exhaust all domestic remedies 
before the ECtHR can hear an appeal: “[t]he Court may only deal with 
the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to 
the generally recognised rules of international law.”254 The reference to 
the rules of international law alludes to the customary international law 
nature of the obligation to exhaust local remedies.255 Pursuant to this 
requirement, applicants must exhaust all legal remedies at the domestic 
level before they can submit an appeal to the ECtHR.  
The requirement to exhaust local remedies pursues both a substantive 
and practical objective. Substantively, the ECtHR is intended to operate 
as a subsidiary to European domestic courts. It is thus appropriate that 
  
 253. See supra note 165. Although, as noted above, specific performance of 
contracts for personal services tends to be frowned upon, even in domestic jurisdictions. 
 254. ECHR, art. 35(1). 
 255. See ICCPR, art. 41(1)(c); see also American Convention, art. 46(1)(a); see 
also African Charter, art. 50, 56(5); see also Request for the Indication of Interim 
Measures of Protection (Switz. v. U.S.), Order, 1957 I.J.C. 105 (Oct. 24). 
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domestic courts initially determine the extent to which an individual’s 
rights have been infringed at the domestic law level.256 Practically, the 
requirement helps the Court deal with a backlog of cases, which have 
ranged between 65,000 to 160,000 over the past few years.257 Due to 
these two objectives, thousands of applications are handily rejected every 
year for want of local exhaustion of remedies.258 
The requirement to exhaust local remedies, however, also puts IGO 
staff members in a quandary vis-à-vis domestic courts. On the one hand, 
these courts recognize that they are under a positive obligation to ensure 
that human rights are respected on their territory. On the other hand, 
adjudicating such disputes would run counter to the terms of the host 
nation agreements, many of which are enacted into law, that confer 
immunities to IGOs.259 The resulting case law at the European level has 
yielded many inconsistencies, all the while requiring IGO staff to invest 
large sums of money to fund oft-futile litigation costs.260  
B. Lack of a Common European Position. 
The ECtHR tends to track the views of European domestic courts 
when determining the standard of review to apply to a given appeal. 
Accordingly, ECtHR case law on the consistency of immunities from 
suit with fair hearing rights has developed over time, as Member States’ 
attitudes towards immunities have themselves transitioned from 
supporting absolute immunities to preferring a more functional or 
restrictive variation.261 European domestic courts were initially 
  
 256. A v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 142 (2010).  
 257. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Migrants’ Avoidance of the European Court of 
Human Rights Concerns Us All, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/02/10/migrants-avoidance-of-the-european-court-
of-human-rights-concerns-us-all/. 
 258. Cesare P. R. Romano, The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: 
Theory and Practice in International Human Rights Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TULLIO 
TREVES 561, 569 (N. Boschiero et al. eds., 2013). 
 259. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 24, at 984. 
 260. A point made by the appellant, to little avail, in Perez v. Germany, App. No. 
15521/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (2015). 
 261. See generally Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the 
Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L. J. 
1730 (2011), where this theme is explored in detail. 
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disinclined to exercise jurisdiction over claims against immune entities, 
dismissing the application of human rights treaties to such entities or 
denying that they are territorially seized of jurisdiction in the first place.  
The Mandelier case litigated in Belgian courts in the 1960s is an 
example of this initial approach.262 This litigation featured claims against 
the UN for operations conducted in the Congo.263 The claimant 
challenged the consistency of the sovereign immunities cited by the UN 
with the right to a fair hearing contained in the UDHR and ECHR.264 The 
first instance tribunal dismissed the UDHR as a non-binding instrument, 
and considered that the terms of the ECHR, concluded between 14 
European states at the time, could not be foisted upon the UN.265 The 
Appeals Court affirmed on appeal, but recognized that “in the present 
state of international institutions there is no court to which the appellant 
can submit his dispute with the United Nations . . . which does not seem 
to be in keeping with the principles proclaimed in the [UDHR].”266  
The Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe case, litigated in the United Kingdom, 
is an example of a state denying that it was seized of jurisdiction.267 In its 
ruling, the House of Lords considered that the ECHR’s right to a fair 
hearing could only be infringed where a Member State possessed 
jurisdiction in the first place.268 Where such jurisdiction was prohibited 
under international law, the ECHR could not operate to provide a basis 
for such jurisdiction.269 Lying at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe is a French appellate court decision, UNESCO 
v. Boulois, which invoked the ECHR to find that granting immunity in a 
dispute between an individual and UNESCO would result in a denial of 
justice to the former that would be contrary to French public policy.270  
  
 262. Manderlier v. United Nations, [CA][Court of Appeals Brussels], Sept. 15, 
1969 (Belg.). For a discussion of this case see Decisions of National Tribunals, 1969 
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 235, 236, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/7. 
 263. Decisions of National Tribunals, supra note 262, at 236. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. at 237. 
 267. Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573 (Eng.). 
 268. Id. at 1588.   
 269. Id. 
 270. Cour dތappel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 14e ch., June 19, 1998 
(Fr.). For a summary of this case see 24 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 294, 294-95 (Albert Jan 
van den Berg, ed., 1999). In Greece and Switzerland, the Crete Court of Appeals and 
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German courts pursued yet another approach, distinct from the three 
discussed above, in Hetzel v. EUROCONTROL. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court, in an appeal lodged by a former staff member 
against EUROCONTROL in the 1980s, declined jurisdiction on the basis 
that the ILOAT, the competent authority under EUROCONTROL’s IJS, 
provided an alternative remedy that satisfied the minimum requirements 
contained in the German Constitution.271 
C. The ECHR Treaty Bodies’ Approaches. 
1. The European Commission on Human Rights (EComHR) 
The EComHR operated from 1954 to 1998.272 It received applications 
from individuals seeking a referral, where appropriate, to the ECHR.273 
The EComHR ceased to exist following adoption of Protocol 11 of the 
ECHR, which granted individuals direct access to the ECtHR.274 The 
EComHR received some of the earliest ECHR-based challenges to IGO 
immunities.275 In one such decision, it dismissed an appeal against the 
Netherlands for actions taken by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
on the basis that “the administrative decisions of the Tribunal are not acts 
which occur within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands within the 
  
Swiss Federal Tribunal, respectively, accepted jurisdiction for similar considerations. See 
Reinisch & Weber, supra note 43, at n. 94 (citing to International Centre for Superior 
Mediterranean Agricultural Studies, Court of Appeals of Crete, 191/1991); and Anne-
Marie Thévenot-Werner, The Right of Staff Members to a Tribunal as a Limit to the 
Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organisations in Europe, in 35 ACTORS IN THE 
AGE OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM n. 18 (A. Peters, et al. eds. Society of Comparative 
Legislation 2014) (citing to League of Arabe States, Tribunal Fédéral [TF][Federal 
Tribunal] Jan. 25, 1999 (Switz.)). 
 271. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 
10, 1981, 2 BvR 1058/79  (Ger.). 
 272. Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights, REFWORLD, 
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/COECOMMHR.html (last accessed Apr. 24, 2017). 
 273. Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 145 (1995). 
 274. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 
11, 1994, E.T.S. 155. For a detailed account of the background leading up to Protocol 11, 
see generally Bernhardt, supra note 273. 
 275. Bernhardt, supra note 273. 
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meaning of Article 1 [] of the Convention.”276 In so doing, the EComHR 
seemed to adopt the House of Lord’s position in Holland v. Lampen-
Wolfe. 
In one of its last decisions, the EComHR shifted gears somewhat. In a 
challenge against NATO, the Commission found that the applicant’s fair 
hearing right was not infringed, on the basis that the NATO Appeals 
Board was recognized as established by law in Italy.277 A year later, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR issued two judgments relating to appeals 
against staff dismissals issued by the European Space Agency (ESA), 
discussed immediately below. In these judgments, the Grand Chamber 
seemed to adopt the German Constitutional Court’s position.  
2. ECtHR 
The Grand Chamber heard and decided Waite & Kennedy v. 
Germany278 and Beer & Regan v. Germany279 together. The applicants 
had worked for the ESA over a number of years on reassignment from 
employers based, respectively, in Britain, Ireland, France, and Italy.280 
When their assignments with the ESA terminated or expired, they sought 
recognition from the German Labor Court that they had acquired rights 
under the German Provision of Labor (Temporary Staff) Act, which 
would operate to deem the applicants staff members of the ESA.281 The 
Labor Court declined jurisdiction in all four cases, deeming the actions 
inadmissible on account of ESA’s immunity from suit.282 The applicants 
appealed these decisions of the Labor Court, arguing that they amounted 
to a violation of their right of access to court.283 
  
 276. Spaans v. Netherlands, App. No. 12516/86, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
122, 124 (1988).  
 277. Failla v. Italy, App. No. 40720/98, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1998). 
 278. Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
(1999). 
 279. Beer v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
(1999). 
 280. Waite, ¶¶ 17–18; Beer, ¶ 11. 
 281. Waite, ¶ 13; Beer, ¶ 20. 
 282. Waite, ¶ 17; Beer, ¶ 15. In so doing, the Labor Court gave effect to Art. IV(a) 
of Annex I to the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, 30 May 
1975, 1297 U.N.T.S. 161. 
 283. Waite, ¶ 47; Beer, ¶ 37.  
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The ECtHR held that neither immunity from suit nor the right of 
access to courts were absolute.284 In balancing both, the Court considered 
that “a material factor in determining whether granting ESA immunity 
from German jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether 
the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to 
protect effectively their rights under the Convention.”285 The Court 
determined that ESA’s IJS constituted an effective alternative means.286 
The Court added that, in assessing the conformity of an IJS with the 
Convention, the right to a fair hearing should not turn on domestic law, 
but rather on its autonomous nature as enshrined in the ECHR.287  
The Court’s ruling was well received at the time, particularly as it 
stood in contrast to the unwavering position taken by the United States 
DC Circuit since the 1980s that, notwithstanding the question of whether 
IGOs are subject to absolute or restrictive immunity, staff challenges 
against IGOs do not implicate the latter’s strictly commercial acts.288 The 
European Court’s position better reflected the fundamental character of 
the right to a fair hearing. Lost in the euphoria, however, were concerns 
that the Court had failed to address an important aspect of the applicants’ 
claim: that, as former employees, they were time-barred from accessing 
the ESA IJS.289 The Court’s hesitation to engage in any rigorous 
assessment of what constitutes an ECHR-compliant IGO IJS would come 
to a head in two of its more recent decisions.  
The Court, in Klausecker v. Germany290 and Perez v. Germany291, 
declared two challenges to German courts’ refusals to hear employment 
  
 284. Waite, ¶¶ 59, 67; Beer, ¶¶ 49, 57.  
 285. Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 68 
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 288. Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also, 
in the state court context, Hunter v. United Nations, No. 106796/04, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. 
Misc. Nov. 15, 2004).  
 289. See August Reinisch, Right of Access to Courts-Labor Dispute With 
International Organization-Immunity From Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts-Alternative 
Remedies for Employees of International Organization, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 933, 934 
(1999). 
 290. Klausecker v. Germany, App. No. 415/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015). 
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disputes inadmissible. These challenges concerned, respectively, the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and the UN. Klausecker was refused 
employment with the EPO after he was declared medically unfit for 
duties.292 He sought to challenge the decision under the EPO’s IJS.293 The 
EPO contended that he could not do so, as an external candidate not 
subject to EPO rules and regulations.294 The ILOAT, echoing the 
concerns expressed by the Belgian Appeals Court in Mandelier, declined 
jurisdiction, while acknowledging that its judgment created a legal 
vacuum.295  
The ILOAT urged the EPO to waive immunity or submit to 
arbitration.296 EPO offered to submit to arbitration, but Klausecker 
sought instead to pursue an action in domestic courts.297 The ECtHR, 
without analyzing the terms of arbitration in any detail, considered that 
the very possibility of arbitration was an effective alternative means to 
safeguard Klausecker’s right to a fair hearing.298 In the Court’s view,  
Having regard to the importance in a democratic society of the right to 
a fair trial, of which the right of access to court is an essential aspect, 
the Court therefore considers it decisive whether the applicant had 
available to him reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his 
rights under the Convention.299  
The Court thus declared Klausecker’s appeal inadmissible.  
Having followed Klausecker’s struggles to obtain relief in German 
courts, and the travails of Waite, Kennedy, Beer, and Regan before him, 
Perez, challenging a decision to make her post redundant, brought suit 
directly to the ECtHR, arguing that bringing “futile proceedings” before 
the German courts would surely have rendered her impecunious.300 Perez 
submitted extracts of the Redesign Panel’s report to support her 
  
 292. Klausecker, ¶ 8. 
 293. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. 
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 295. R.K. v. EPO, Judgment No. 2657, Opinion of Judge Rouiller, ¶ 6 (July 11, 
2007 ILOAT). 
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arguments that the UN IJS was, essentially, broken.301 The Court 
disagreed that proceedings in German courts would have yielded 
nothing:  
the Court takes note of the applicant’s argument that there was no 
example of any successful complaint having been brought before the 
Federal Constitutional Court in respect of deficiencies in the protection 
of fundamental rights within international organisations. The Court 
observes that in the three decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 
relied upon by both parties, that court had indeed not considered the 
respective complaints well-founded. However, the facts of these 
complaints differed from those at issue in the present case. Some 
complainants had not shown [sic.] to complain about an act of a “public 
authority.” . . . Other complainants failed to demonstrate that the level 
of fundamental rights protection guaranteed by the (different) 
international organisation in question had, in substance, been generally 
and manifestly below the level required by the Constitution.302  
In a bizarre passage that displayed a willful ignorance of the need for 
(and cost of) legal counsel in complex appeals involving IGO immunities 
from suit, the Court also considered that “the applicant . . . failed to 
substantiate in any way that the proceedings before the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which were exempt from court costs, would have 
had such an effect.”303 The Court thus declared Perez’s appeal 
inadmissible.304 These two decisions by the Court signal a preference for 
declining jurisdiction over engaging in too rigorous an evaluation of the 
ECHR-consistency of an IGO’s IJS.305  
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3. Assessment 
European domestic court practice has largely tracked the ECtHR’s 
approach.306 In a number of proceedings brought before Belgian,307 
French,308 Italian,309 and Swiss310 courts following the Grand Chamber’s 
deliberations in Waite & Kennedy v. Germany and Beer & Regan v. 
Germany, we see that European courts have exhibited a willingness to 
examine whether an IJS exists. Where such IJS exists, these courts have 
tended to assume that they are ECHR-compliant. Where an IJS is 
lacking, however, some of these courts have found a violation of the 
right to a fair hearing.311  
One notable exception relates to a Belgian judgment finding that the 
IJS of the Western European Union (WEU) failed to provide staff 
members with an ECHR-compliant right to a fair hearing.312 In Siedler v. 
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WEU, the Belgian court found that there were no provisions for 
executing judgments of the WEU Appeals Commission, hearings were 
not public, and decisions rendered were not always published.313 Further 
Appeals Commission members were employed under short-term 
renewable contracts, raising concerns about their purported independence 
and impartiality.314 
The Belgian precedent, in my view, best reflects the spirit of the 
ECtHR’s holding in Waite & Kennedy v. Germany and Beer & Regan v. 
Germany. A reviewing court’s enquiry should not stop at the moment 
that an existing IJS has been identified. Rather, such a court should 
carefully analyze whether the IJS is one capable of providing users with 
a meaningful right to a fair hearing. The enquiry should not end once 
some evidence of a right of access to a tribunal is found. Rather, in 
keeping with Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, all aspects of the right to a 
fair hearing should be assessed for compliance with the ECHR. A 
reviewing court, in this regard, should be mindful of the extreme 
prejudice that an applicant will suffer should it refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction. Such refusals effectively deprive the applicant of a judicial 
remedy for breach of his or her civil rights or obligations.  
It is important to note, in this respect, that careful scrutiny of an 
IGO’s IJS will often fail to reveal important deficiencies therein. The 
Rules Working Group cautioned that, while aspects of the WTO IJS 
might seem compliant with the right to a fair hearing on paper, the 
application of the rules by the DGO rendered them less so:  
Staff expressed concern about the systematic failure of the 
Organization to conform to its own staff rules, regulations and policies, 
particularly during the period 2005-2013, as described below. The lack 
of consistency, transparency and accountability in the application of 
rules – and the arbitrary way in which decisions were made and 
resources were managed – served to undermine the efficiency, 
professionalism and morale of the secretariat. However, it was widely 
felt that the main problem was not the rules themselves - which were 
  
 313. Id.  
 314. Id. ¶¶ 60–62. 
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generally sound and sufficient – but rather the inconsistent, 
unpredictable and arbitrary way in which they were applied.315 
V. CONCLUSION 
Countries such as the United States were initially hesitant to extend 
diplomatic immunities to officials of the League of Nations.316 Such 
immunities were conferred exclusively to foreign dignitaries.317 Prior to 
conclusion of the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences, IGO 
officials regularly had tax exemption demands turned down.318 Yet, today 
United States courts hesitate to even rule on whether IGOs hold absolute 
or restrictive immunities from suit. The disparate treatment by domestic 
courts of immunities from suit of IGOs relative to foreign sovereigns 
defies logic. Domestic courts, particularly in the domain of investment 
arbitration, sometimes exhibit little hesitation before overriding foreign 
sovereign immunity. Yet, these same courts appear unwilling to do the 
same against IGOs. This is particularly odd as IGO immunities are 
derived from, and presumably subordinated to, foreign sovereign 
immunity.  
The P&I Conventions specify requirements that apply to the 
maintenance of immunities enjoyed by IGOs. One such requirement is 
that IGOs “make provisions for appropriate modes of” dispute 
settlement.319 The failure by an IGO to provide a system of alternative 
justice may result in the loss of its immunities. IGOs have thus complied 
with this obligation by promulgating an IJS. Such an IJS will normally 
recognize the appellate jurisdiction of the UNAT or ILOAT. There are 
significant shortcomings in the administration of justice pursuant to these 
  
 315. Working Group on Rules, supra note 59, ¶¶ 1.1–1.2. 
 316. U.S. Dept. of State, Opinion of the Department of State on Status of League 
of Nations Officials in the United States, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. 413–14 
(1927). 
 317. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 138 (1812). 
 318. Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 332, 334 (1946). Today, while tax exemptions are not formally recognized, staff 
members of IGOs to which the United States is a party will typically be reimbursed their 
tax dues—a practice approved by the United States following conclusion of the Bretton 
Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences. 
 319. General P&I Convention, art. VIII, § 29; Specialized P&I Convention, art. 
IX, § 31.  
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IJSs. IJS rules are either deficient on their face, or selectively applied by 
IGO Administrations. As a result, IGO staff members are deprived of 
their right to have most of their employment-related civil rights and 
obligations litigated before an impartial and independent judicial body. 
Such rights and obligations fall into a legal void. Recourse to the ILOAT 
and, to a far lesser extent following reforms, the UNAT, provides little 
counterweight to the resulting accountability gap.  
It is encouraging that certain IGOs have initiated reforms to improve 
their IJSs. The UN, in particular, undertook extensive reforms to its IJS. 
The WTO is, hopefully, in the process of doing the same. As well-
intentioned as these reform initiatives might be, however, IGO 
administrations will be naturally disinclined to cede too much power in 
the framework of introspective internal reforms. This being the case, it is 
important that domestic courts exercise some level of external review 
over IJSs. Domestic courts have hesitated to exercise jurisdiction over 
disputes between an IGO and its staff member, owing to the terms of 
host country immunity agreements. This hesitation clashes with courts’ 
duties to ensure that human rights are being respected in their territories.  
Promoters of IGOs were probably right to worry, in the mid-20th 
century, that governments might seek to influence IGO policies through 
judicial proceedings. Today’s context is quite different from that of the 
post-war reconstruction period. The Bretton Woods and Dumbarton 
Oaks institutions have grown in ways arguably unanticipated by their 
foundational treaties. If anything, the lack of external judicial checks on 
IGOs has, over time, allowed them to run roughshod over their rules and 
regulations. Sometimes, the consequences have been grave. The lack of 
accountability for IGOs towards their staff, in a day and age of universal 
respect for human rights is, quite simply, inexcusable: particularly as 
many such IGOs pursue the promotion of human rights as part of their 
growing mandates.  
Appellants are required to exhaust domestic court proceedings before 
they can access the ECtHR. European domestic courts have proven 
fertile venues for appeals against IGOs as of late. This is due in large part 
to the heavy concentration of IGOs in Europe. These courts have 
progressively demonstrated a willingness to look beyond an IGO’s 
immunities, particularly where an appellant’s right to a fair hearing risks 
being violated. This is in line with the ECtHR’s direction to European 
domestic courts to assess whether the respondent IGOs in such actions 
are providing their staff a reasonable alternative means to protect 
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effectively their rights under the Convention. In decisions following this 
ruling, however, the ECtHR has hesitated to follow through on its own 
direction. The resulting uncertainty leaves IGO staff members treading 
into European domestic courts with much trepidation, all while incurring 
significant legal fees.  
A. The Way Forward. 
Much coordination is needed between courts, states, civil society, and 
IGOs to alter the status quo. I will discuss each in turn.  
Courts. It is important for courts in Europe and abroad to critically 
assess the compatibility of IGO IJSs with the right to a fair hearing. It 
may be instructive, in this respect, for these courts to more fully embrace 
the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Solange (“as long as”) trilogy 
of jurisprudence, developed in relation to constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights and EU law.320 Pursuant to the first and second 
installment of this trilogy, the German Court signaled that it would 
accept the splitting of competences between national law and EU law, 
and decline jurisdiction in favor of EU law only insofar as Community 
law afforded an equal level of protection for fundamental rights.321 In the 
third and final installment, the German Court clarified that actions of EU 
institutions were not free from judicial scrutiny:  
Acts done under a special power, separate from national powers of the 
member-States, exercised by a supra-national organization also affect 
the holders of basic rights in Germany. They therefore affect the 
guarantees of the Constitution and the duties of the Constitutional 
  
 320. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
May 29, 1974, 2 BvL 52/71 2 [C.M.L.R.] 540 (Ger.) (Solange I); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986, 2 
BvR 197/83 [3 C.M.L.R.] 225 (Ger.) (Solange II); see also Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159.92 [1 
C.M.L.R.] 57 (Ger.) (Solange III). 
 321. The German Court initially expressed this right in positive terms—that it 
would assert jurisdiction unless EU law provided equivalent protection for fundamental 
rights. See 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (540–42) (Ger.) (Solange I). The Court subsequently softened 
its approach, indicating that it would decline jurisdiction unless EU law failed to provide 
equivalent protection for fundamental rights. See 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (227) (Ger.) (Solange
II). 
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Court, the object of which is the protection of constitutional rights in 
Germany – in this respect not merely as against German state bodies.322 
One would have expected, in light of the Solange trilogy, that the 
German Constitutional Court would have exercised a more stringent 
review of EUROCONTROL’s IJS in the above-cited summary of 
national court decisions on IJSs.323 Yet, in each of the Solange decisions, 
the Court ceded jurisdiction to EU law. The Court was not engaging in a 
game of chicken with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Rather, it was 
engaging in a form of muted dialogue with the ECJ, which the ECJ 
seemed to acknowledge when it accepted, a few years after Solange I, 
that Community law (as it was then) could be challenged on the basis 
that it violated fundamental rights.324 
Elements of Solange can be drawn from the ECtHR’s rulings in Waite
& Kennedy v. Germany and Beer & Regan v. Germany.325 I would 
submit that the European Court, in these two cases, initiated a muted 
dialogue with EU-based IGOs and/or the ILOAT and UNAT. Held in its 
best light possible, accordingly, it may be that the European Court in 
Klausecker v. Germany and Perez v. Germany was not yet ready to 
condemn an IJS, in the hope that corrective action would be taken on the 
IGO front. The revised UN IJS would seem to have vindicated the 
Court’s decision to some degree—indeed, while these revisions could not 
have formed part of the record of proceedings, the Court was surely 
aware of the UN reforms implementing the same Redesign Panel 
recommendations Perez had submitted into evidence, when the Court 
declined admissibility.  
The problem with European Court’s approach, however, is that other 
IGOs do not face the same level of scrutiny as the UN. Smaller IGOs are 
more likely to keep operating deficient IJSs in the shadows, until such 
time as the Court strikes one down as falling short of guaranteeing the 
right to a fair hearing. Until the European Court does so, domestic courts 
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10, 1981, 2 BvR 1058/79  (Ger.). 
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should exercise jurisdiction in IGO staff members’ appeals, and 
scrutinize the IJSs at issue. These courts would be well advised to follow 
the above-cited Belgian example, and assess whether or to what extent 
each material element of an IGO’s IJS measures up to ECHR-mandated 
standards.  
The tendency of courts to decline jurisdiction in matters pertaining to 
the human rights of IGO staff members, using one issue avoidance 
technique after another, is regrettable and by no means unimpeachable. 
In appropriate cases, it may be deemed a denial of justice, forcing one 
specific category of litigants to operate in a no-man’s land in terms of 
access to protection from violation of their human rights. 
States. States are, generally speaking, blissfully unaware of IJS-
related transgressions. Perhaps owing in part to confidentiality 
undertakings signed by IGO staff members with their IGO, staff 
grievances go largely unreported. States should push IGOs to amend 
their confidentiality undertakings to allow such staff to transmit copies of 
any grievances they have submitted pursuant to an IJS to their diplomatic 
missions. It bears emphasizing that there are presently no suitable proxy 
indicators reported in IGO yearly reports for staff grievances. Staff 
turnover figures come close, but such turnovers can (and often do) relate 
to reasons unconnected to a grievance or disciplinary measures. State 
missions should be pressured by national legislatures to raise more 
searching questions with IGOs on IJS-related issues, whether by written 
request, or in plenary or sessional meetings.  
If IGOs are not forthcoming in their responses, states should tie 
funding to increased IJS-related transparency. Indeed, states should more 
broadly engage with their role as custodians of IGOs by holding them 
accountable for staff grievances. States created IGOs largely for reasons 
of efficacy, notably to reduce coordination problems and transaction 
costs. As a consequence, states typically evaluate IGOs by scrutinizing 
their yearly activity reports, and annual financial audits.326 No IGO 
publishes data, aggregated or otherwise, on its IJS in either publication. 
Until such time as they are explicitly asked to provide this information, 
IGOs will tend to follow the WTO in sweeping this data under the carpet. 
  
 326. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 352 (2d ed., Cambridge University Press 2005). 
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States should thus tie IGO funding commitments to increased 
transparency with respect to IJS-related performance indicators.  
Until such time as IJS-specific data is conveyed to states by IGOs, 
states should actively monitor publicly reported cases. States should do 
so by keeping track of the latest judgments released by UNAT or ILOAT 
on their websites, in addition to any litigation launched in their domestic 
courts. Inasmuch as patterns in allegations develop in these judgments 
and litigation, states should ask IGOs to account for these, 
notwithstanding the final underlying outcomes. The fact that a tribunal 
finds for an IGO for want of sufficient evidence on the record, or a court 
declines jurisdiction, as I have set out above, does not necessarily 
indicate that the complaints lodged were without merit.  
Civil Society. Civil society, in turn, should support the work of entities 
such as the IALCE to evaluate the degree to which IGO IJSs rank against 
human rights norms. There are important human rights elements at play 
when individuals are unable to have their civil rights and obligations 
determined before an independent and impartial tribunal. In many 
instances where IGO staff members are seeking relief in local courts, for 
example, they are likely doing so challenging a wrongful termination. 
Their right to work is a fundamental economic and social right, codified 
in the UDHR327 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.328  
Problematically enough, not many NGOs view IJS deficiencies as a 
hot ticket item. Even those NGOs focused on the right to a fair trial 
typically support or publicize fair hearing issues as they arise in criminal 
proceedings, normally featuring egregious violations of natural justice in 
countries with weak rules of law.329 Victims represented or supported in 
these proceedings lend themselves easily to public sympathy. IGO staff 
members aggrieved or disciplined by an IGO, in contrast, may be 
perceived as well-remunerated victims seeking access to courts in 
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developed countries. Such individuals may not, as such, fit the standard 
“victim profile” that NGOs will seek out.  
I would submit, however, that focusing on the optics of the victims 
misses the point. Rather, the focus should be on the implications of the 
accountability gap created by the immunities of IGOs. Those victims that 
thematic NGOs prefer to support will, in many cases, be protected by 
national laws that are misapplied or ignored. Reprehensible as this is, 
IGO staff members, in contrast, are arguably not properly subject to any 
laws at all. In other words, whereas a victim in the former case will have 
suffered a miscarriage of some form of justice, positive or natural, the 
law of international organizations has developed over the past century to 
erase a large swath of IGO staff members’ civil rights and obligations. 
This runs squarely counter to the above-referenced human rights 
paradigm.  
Over time, the external pressures exerted by these three actors, 
namely courts, states, and civil society, should generate sufficient 
pressure on IGOs to transition away from resisting adoption of even 
those cosmetic IJS amendments proposed by the WTO Rules Working 
Group, and towards embracing comprehensive IJS reform of the type 
embodied in the UN Redesign Panel’s recommendations, most of which 
were adopted by the UN.330 More importantly, these pressures might 
even obviate the need for IJS reforms: if national courts are willing and 
able to scrutinize an IGO’s IJS, staff members may ultimately prefer 
litigating in domestic courts rather than engaging an internal mechanism 
that takes between 4-5 years to reach an unsatisfactory conclusion. 
 
  
 330. Subject, as I mentioned above, to at least the broadening of the measures that 
can be challenged in the IJS. Ideally, also with the removal of the SGO’s right to 
compensate in lieu of specific performance. 
